市场领导者与行业质量水平：内生质量和时序选择模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (8): 141-148.

• 论文 • 上一篇

市场领导者与行业质量水平：内生质量和时序选择模型

叶光亮¹, 王欣²

1. 中国人民大学, 北京 100872;
2. 三亚学院财经学院, 海南三亚 572022

收稿日期:2011-10-03 修回日期:2014-04-29 出版日期:2014-08-20 发布日期:2014-08-23
作者简介:叶光亮（1980- ），男（汉族），浙江苍南人，中国人民大学教授，研究方向：应用微观经济学产业组织理论、规制与反垄断.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71273270，71133006）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金（11YJC790244）；霍英东教育基金（141082）；中国人民大学科学研究基金中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助（14XNI006）

Market Leadership and Industrial Quality：an Endogenous Quality and Timing Model

YE Guang-liang¹, WANG Xin²

1. Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
2. Sanya University Sanya 572022, China

Received:2011-10-03 Revised:2014-04-29 Online:2014-08-20 Published:2014-08-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文探讨不同的定价时序如何影响双寡头模型中的质量选择问题。研究表明：在一个垂直产品差异的双寡头博弈中，与同时定价博弈相比，厂商采用序贯定价会使市场内的高、低质量差距缩小；而且跟随者利润上升，领导者利润却会下降，消费者剩余和社会总剩余都会下降。最后，还发现在内生时序选择模型中，均衡时序选择会是高、低质量企业都选择作为跟随者进行同时定价。

关键词: 价格竞争, 内生质量, 内生时序

Abstract: Effects of pricing leadership on endogenous quality decisions in a duopoly are examined with vertical product differentiation. The study that quality gap between high and low quality products decreases in the market with leadership (sequential game) compared to the market without leadership (simultaneous game). Follower's profit always increases but the leader's profit decreases. Furthermore, both consumer surplus and social welfare decreases in the leadership model. Finally, it also can be found that with a single pre-game delay stage, the resulting endogenous timing has both firms being followers.

Key words: price competition, endogenous quality, endogenous timing

中图分类号:

F062.9

叶光亮, 王欣. 市场领导者与行业质量水平：内生质量和时序选择模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(8): 141-148.

YE Guang-liang, WANG Xin. Market Leadership and Industrial Quality：an Endogenous Quality and Timing Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(8): 141-148.

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市场领导者与行业质量水平：内生质量和时序选择模型

Market Leadership and Industrial Quality：an Endogenous Quality and Timing Model

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