基于协同救助的海上救助报酬合理分配方法

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (9): 74-81.

基于协同救助的海上救助报酬合理分配方法

王军, 王美蓉, 曲然琳

大连海事大学交通运输管理学院, 辽宁大连 116026

收稿日期:2013-07-01 修回日期:2014-03-03 出版日期:2014-09-20 发布日期:2014-09-27
作者简介:王军（1963-），男（汉族），辽宁人，大连海事大学交通运输管理学院，教授，研究方向：应急管理、风险工程、航运与港口工程.
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目（13BGJ045）

Research on the Equitable Apportionment of Marine Salvage Reward Based on Collaborative Rescue at Sea

WANG Jun, WANG Mei-rong, QU Ran-lin

Department of Transportation Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China

Received:2013-07-01 Revised:2014-03-03 Online:2014-09-20 Published:2014-09-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 海上救助报酬是为鼓励人们冒险参与海上救援，由受益人给予救助人的补偿和回报，具有射幸性，奉行“无效果、无报酬”的给付原则。本文以救助方成本性和非成本性投入对救助效果的贡献为依据，首先对各方的成本性投入进行补偿；然后从资源要素的关键性和参与人的重要性两个维度对各救助方的贡献进行综合评价，并按贡献度对“剩余”部分进行二次分配，两次分配之和即为各救助方所获得的分配总额。通过运用“重购成本”和Shapley值法分别对资源要素的关键性和参与人的重要性进行客观度量，该方法可同时解决共同救助报酬的外部分配与内部分配问题，不仅避免了目前各国司法实践中按成本投入比例进行分配的不合理性，也更能体现相关国际公约和国内立法有关救助报酬分配的原则。

关键词: 海上救助报酬, 无效果, 无报酬, 合理分配, 重购成本, Shapley值

Abstract: Marine salvage reward aims to encourage volunteers to rescue properties in distress at sea following by "no cure no pay principle". Based on the equitable apportionment of the rewards,the effective rescue is benefited with sufficient collaboration by all salvors. In practice, the apportionment of rewards is normally calculated on the capital input of the co-salvors, neglecting the contribution of non-capital inputs. In this paper, a solution is present which compensates the capital input of each salvor firstly, then evaluates the contribution of non-capital inputs with two dimensions, which are the importance of the participants and the non-substitutable roles of their resources measured by the algorithm of Shapley value and re-purchase costs separately. This solution can be used for both external and interior apportionment of rewards among salvors and meeting the requests of the relevant international conventions and domestic law of each country thoroughly.

Key words: marine salvage reward, no cure no pay principle, equitable apportionment, re-purchase cost, Shapley value

中图分类号:

F550.5
X951

王军, 王美蓉, 曲然琳. 基于协同救助的海上救助报酬合理分配方法[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(9): 74-81.

WANG Jun, WANG Mei-rong, QU Ran-lin. Research on the Equitable Apportionment of Marine Salvage Reward Based on Collaborative Rescue at Sea[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(9): 74-81.

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