基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (9): 133-140.

基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究

孔峰, 张微

华北电力大学经济管理系, 河北保定 071003

收稿日期:2012-10-09 修回日期:2014-01-04 出版日期:2014-09-20 发布日期:2014-09-27
作者简介:孔峰（1972-），男（汉族），河北人，华北电力大学经济管理系，教授，博士后，研究方向：委托代理理论.
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目（13YJA630039）

On Long-Term Incentive Optimal Combination Model of State-Owned Enterprise Managers Based on Double Reputation

KONG Feng, ZHANG Wei

Department of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003, China

Received:2012-10-09 Revised:2014-01-04 Online:2014-09-20 Published:2014-09-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文在委托-代理理论框架下，以委托人的目标（企业长期业绩的最大化）为立足点，研究国企经理人的各种行为特征和长期激励的最优组合，建立了国企经理人双重声誉激励和股票期权激励的组合模型。本文充分结合了我国国企经理人的特点，把政治声誉模型化，在股票期权报酬形式下，研究了双重声誉（政治声誉和市场声誉）对经理人的长期激励效果，即经理人声誉影响系数最优水平和分享利润比例最优水平。并在此基础上系统分析了经理人的行为选择特征、最优激励程度以及声誉影响系数的影响因素，为经理人的长期激励提出了参考建议。

关键词: 国企经理人, 双重声誉, 股票期权, 长期激励, 最优化组合

Abstract: Short-term behavior problem of the managers is very serious in China's state-owned enterprise (SOE). It seriously prevents the state-owned enterprise's long-term development. To make China's economic prosperity and development, the SOE managers must implement the effective long-term incentive. Under the principal-agent theory, taking the goal of principal (maximizing the company's future performance) as foothold of research, the optimal combination of long-term incentive is studied and a combined model of double reputation (market reputation and political reputation) incentive and stock options incentive for SOE managers is proposed. Combining with the characteristics of China's SOE managers with the payment form of stock options, political reputation is modelled, and long-term incentive effect of double reputation, the optimal level of reputation influence coefficient and the optimal level of profit sharing ratio is studied. On the basis, the influencing factors of the manager's behavior choices characteristics, optimal incentive level of reputation and its' influence coefficient are analyzed. Finally,some suggestions are proposed for SOE manager's long-term incentive based on research results. This paper found that the rise of incentive degree can make the manager's behavior more in line with the interests of the enterprise. And the strengthening of optimal incentive degree can be though adjusting the impact factor to realize. In reputation incentive, the reduction of political reputation influence can lower the managers' speculative behavior level. And the reduction of political reputation influence coefficient can realize through the increasing the utility coefficient of market reputation.

Key words: SOE managers, double reputation, stock options incentive, long-term incentive, optimal combination

中图分类号:

孔峰, 张微. 基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(9): 133-140.

KONG Feng, ZHANG Wei. On Long-Term Incentive Optimal Combination Model of State-Owned Enterprise Managers Based on Double Reputation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(9): 133-140.

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