考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (11): 54-61.

考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析

殷红

华东师范大学商学院, 上海 200241

收稿日期:2012-04-04 修回日期:2013-04-05 出版日期:2014-11-20 发布日期:2014-11-21
作者简介:殷红(1976-),女(汉族),湖北随州人,华东师范大学商学院,副教授,博士,研究方向:信息经济学、决对策理论.
基金资助:
国家社科基金资助项目(10CGL014);武汉科技大学冶金工业过程湖北省重点实验室开放课题资助项目(B201004)

Research on the Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auction with Advertiser Reputation——Equilibrium, Revenue and Efficiency Analysis

YIN Hong

Business School, East China Normal University, Shanghai 200241, China

Received:2012-04-04 Revised:2013-04-05 Online:2014-11-20 Published:2014-11-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 搜索关键字拍卖机制的逐利本质诱发了大量的虚假广告,引发了公众的广泛争议,信誉已成为搜索媒体改进其拍卖机制必须考虑的关键因素之一。通过在关键字GSP拍卖模型中引入广告主信誉因素,提出了一种可信竞价排名的GSP拍卖机制,与传统拍卖机制相比,能有效提高中标广告主的信誉水平,通过对广告主均衡竞价策略、均衡收益与效率的分析表明,在广告主信誉差别较大时,该机制在增进搜索引擎收益和拍卖效率方面也有一定的优势;最后通过研究均衡的实现路径和模拟实验,在不完全信息动态环境下也验证了这一结论。

关键词: 付费搜索拍卖, GSP机制, VCG均衡, 拍卖效率

Abstract: Profit-driven of keyword auction mechanism induces huge amounts of network fraud information, which greatly damages the interests of users.Through analyzing the optimum equilibrium bidding strategies and comparing with GSP auction mechanism which is widely used, found the ranking rule considering reputation is more conducive than the simple rule of competitive ranking to improve advertising auction's profit and efficiency, when the difference between credibility of advertisers is large. Further, through analyzing the quilibrium realization path and numerical simulation, the conclusion is also verified under a dynamic circumstance.

Key words: sponsored search auction, GSP mechanism, VCG equilibrium, advertiser reputation, auction efficiency

中图分类号:

F224.33

殷红. 考虑广告主信誉的付费搜索拍卖机制研究——均衡、收益与效率分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(11): 54-61.

YIN Hong. Research on the Mechanism of Sponsored Search Auction with Advertiser Reputation——Equilibrium, Revenue and Efficiency Analysis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(11): 54-61.

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