双重委托代理对上市公司过度投资的影响路径分析——基于异质性双边随机边界模型

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (11): 131-139.

双重委托代理对上市公司过度投资的影响路径分析——基于异质性双边随机边界模型

李春红¹, 王苑萍², 郑志丹¹

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030;
2. 中信银行总行营业部, 北京 100033

收稿日期:2012-07-29 修回日期:2013-03-27 出版日期:2014-11-20 发布日期:2014-11-21
作者简介:李春红(1969-),女(汉族),云南文山人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院副教授,管理学博士,研究方向:公司治理、金融市场.

The Path Analysis of The Dual Principal-agent Problem Affects the Over-investment of Listed Companies: Based on the Two-tier Heterogeneity Stochastic Frontier Model

LI Chun-hong¹, WANG Yuan-ping², ZHENG Zhi-dan¹

1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;
2. China CITIC Bank, Beijing 100032, China

Received:2012-07-29 Revised:2013-03-27 Online:2014-11-20 Published:2014-11-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 使用前沿异质性双边随机边界模型测度我国上市公司过度投资程度,运用结构方程路径分析双重委托代理问题对投资过度的作用机制和具体效应。得出:(1) 我国上市公司过度投资与投资不足并存,其中,代理成本引致的过度投资使投资支出超出其最优水平的31.4%,占样本的42.8%;(2)管理层持股通过自由现金流、债务、股利支付等不同路径影响公司投资,能有效缓解过度投资,而大股东代理通过自由现金流和债务结构加剧投资过度;(3)双重委托代理对公司投资影响的77.38%是通过自由现金流路径实现的,债务路径的贡献率占21.24%,股利路径表现不显著,未能产生显著的约束功效。

关键词: 双重委托代理, 过度投资, 双边随机边界模型, 路径分析

Abstract: Two-frontier heterogeneity stochastic frontier model is used to measure the over-investment level of listed companies of China, and Structural equation as well as path analysis are exert to research the mechanism and effects that dual principal-agent problem affects the over-investment of companies. The conclusions are as follows.(1)In China, over-investment and under-investment are both existed in the listed companies. Over-investment which is caused by agency cost makes investment cost have a 31.4% plus over the best level, and occupies 42.8% of the sample.(2)Managerial stockholding incentive would ease the over-investment of listed companies through the paths of free cash flow, capital structure and dividend payment. On the contrary, the control of large shareholders would aggravate over-investment through the paths of free cash flow and capital structure.(3) 77.38%of company investment effect caused by dual principal-agent problem is brought about through the path of free cash flow. The rest 21.24% is contributed by the path of debt. The path of dividend is not remarkable, and does not produce remarkable constraint efficiency.

Key words: dual principal-agent problem, over-investment, two-tier heterogeneity stochastic frontier model, path analysis

中图分类号:

F832.48

李春红, 王苑萍, 郑志丹. 双重委托代理对上市公司过度投资的影响路径分析——基于异质性双边随机边界模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(11): 131-139.

LI Chun-hong, WANG Yuan-ping, ZHENG Zhi-dan. The Path Analysis of The Dual Principal-agent Problem Affects the Over-investment of Listed Companies: Based on the Two-tier Heterogeneity Stochastic Frontier Model[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(11): 131-139.

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