基于网络零售平台的激励合同研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (12): 79-84.

基于网络零售平台的激励合同研究

徐和, 何燕, 马士华

华中科技大学管理学院, 湖北武汉 430074

收稿日期:2012-12-21 修回日期:2013-09-22 出版日期:2014-12-20 发布日期:2014-12-23
作者简介:徐和(1978-),男(汉族),湖北武汉人,华中科技大学管理学院,副教授,研究方向:库存管理、供应链管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271092);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET110188)

Incentive Contract Design When Platform-Selling

XU He, HE Yan, MA Shi-hua

School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Received:2012-12-21 Revised:2013-09-22 Online:2014-12-20 Published:2014-12-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于网络零售平台的直销模式已成为电子零售的一种新模式。在该模式下,制造商借助电子零售商的网络平台发布产品信息(价格、交货期等)并负责产品的销售。电子零售商仅提供其网络平台并收取相应费用。基于此直销模式,针对终端消费者对产品的交货期支付意愿异质性且信息私有的特点,分析了制造商的最优激励合同(价格和交货时间的设定)和电子零售商的最佳收益分享比例。借助数值仿真,讨论了私有的支付意愿信息和成本等因素对最优决策和利润的影响。

关键词: 网络零售平台直销, 异质性市场, 激励合同, 收益共享

Abstract: In this article, the interactive decisions between a manufacturer and a e-retailer in a platform-selling mode when consumers are heterogeneous and have private information is investigated. The manufacturer publishes his information including price and delivery time, etc. through the e-retailer's platforms and sell products. The e-retailer provides his platform only and charges a percentage fee. Through a two-stage Stackelberg model, how the manufacturer designs the incentive contract and the e-retailer charges the percentage is analyzed. The effects of different parameters (private information and cost structure) on the optimal decisions and the performance of each party and the whole chain with the aid of numerical examinations are explored.

Key words: platform-selling, heterogeneous market, incentive contract, revenue sharing

中图分类号:

F274

徐和, 何燕, 马士华. 基于网络零售平台的激励合同研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(12): 79-84.

XU He, HE Yan, MA Shi-hua. Incentive Contract Design When Platform-Selling[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(12): 79-84.

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