制造商流程改进与采购合同联合优化

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.05.020

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 161-167.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.05.020

制造商流程改进与采购合同联合优化

申笑宇, 黄河, 徐鸿雁

重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030

收稿日期:2013-05-22 修回日期:2014-04-21 出版日期:2015-05-20 发布日期:2015-05-20
作者简介:申笑宇(1988-),女(汉族),湖南邵东人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,博士研究生,研究方向:供应风险管理、采购合同设计.
基金资助:
国家青年拔尖人才支持计划;国家自然科学基金资助项目(71471021,71472017,71071171,71002069);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0550);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CQDXWL-2012-Z108,CQDXWL-2013-082,CQDXWL-2014-Z020)

Joint Optimization of Procurement Contracts and Process Improvement Initiated by the Manufacturer

SHEN Xiao-yu, HUANG He, XU Hong-yan

School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China

Received:2013-05-22 Revised:2014-04-21 Online:2015-05-20 Published:2015-05-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 如何降低供应风险是供应链管理中的热点问题。本文考虑供应商拥有关于初始可靠性的私有信息,且制造商流程改进可提高初始可靠性,运用委托代理理论,研究了制造商流程改进和采购策略联合优化下的最优合同设计。通过对比对称和不对称信息下制造商的最优采购合同,发现信息不对称的存在降低了制造商向低初始可靠性供应商订货的概率,还可能导致过度努力。信息不对称的存在不一定造成社会福利损失,也不一定产生信息租金。当供应商的初始可靠性水平和纳什谈判力满足一定条件时,相比与制造商的最优采购合同,供应商披露私有信息会使供应链实现帕累托改进。最后通过算例验证了模型的结论。本文对供应风险下的采购实践有很好的参考价值和指导意义。

关键词: 供应风险, 信息不对称, 流程改进, 采购合同

Abstract: Risk mitigation is a hot topic in supply chain management. We consider a manufacturer faces an unreliable supplier with private information on high or low initial reliability, and the initial reliability can be enhanced through process improvement initiated by the manufacturer. By applying the principle-agent theory, the optimal contracts including both the manufacturer's process improvement and procurement decision are designed. By comparing the manufacturer's optimal contracts under full and asymmetric information, it is found that, information asymmetry decreases the probability that the manufacturer orders from the supplier with low initial reliability, and may lead to over-improvement on him. Information asymmetry does not necessarily decrease social welfare or lead to information rent. When the initial reliabilities and the supplier's Nash bargaining power satisfy some conditions, compared with the manufacturer's optimal procurement contracts, the Pareto improvement of the supply chain can be realized by the supplier's self-revelation of his private information. Numerical examples is used to verify the main conclusions. It is valuable and significant to the procurement activities under supply risk.

Key words: supply disruption, information asymmetry, process improvement, procurement contract

中图分类号:

F274

申笑宇, 黄河, 徐鸿雁. 制造商流程改进与采购合同联合优化[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(5): 161-167.

SHEN Xiao-yu, HUANG He, XU Hong-yan. Joint Optimization of Procurement Contracts and Process Improvement Initiated by the Manufacturer[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(5): 161-167.

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制造商流程改进与采购合同联合优化

Joint Optimization of Procurement Contracts and Process Improvement Initiated by the Manufacturer

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