基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.08.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (8): 63-74.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.08.008

基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究

陈瑞义^1,3, 琚春华², 盛昭瀚³, 江烨⁴

1. 南京邮电大学管理学院, 江苏南京 210023;
2. 浙江工商大学计算机与信息工程学院, 浙江杭州 310018;
3. 南京大学社会科学计算实验中心, 江苏南京 210093;
4. 江苏开放大学商学院, 江苏南京 210036

收稿日期:2013-05-11 修回日期:2014-03-31 出版日期:2015-08-20 发布日期:2015-08-19
作者简介:陈瑞义(1982-),男(汉族),福建长乐人,南京邮电大学管理学院,讲师,研究方向:供应链质量管理.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71471077,71471083);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJCZH020);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般项目(2015SJB010,2015SJD251)

Study of Retailers' Private Brand Supply Chain Quality Collaboration

CHEN Rui-yi^1,3, JU Chun-hua², SHENG Zhao-han³, JIANG Ye⁴

1. School of Management in Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210023, China;
2. School of Computer Science and Information Engineering in Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China;
3. Computational Experiment Center for Social Science in Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;
4. School of Business in Jiangsu Open University, Nanjing 210036, China

Received:2013-05-11 Revised:2014-03-31 Online:2015-08-20 Published:2015-08-19

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于纳什谈判模型,研究零售商谈判实力不断增强下自有品牌产品质量纵向合作策略选择问题,分别对零售商不承担产品质量成本投入的保守型策略,零售商完全承担产品质量成本投入的冒险型策略以及零售商部分承担产品质量成本投入的老练型策略进行研究,获得上述三种策略下产品最优质量、供应链最优总利润以及各成员最优利润的纳什谈判均衡解。在此基础上,给出上述各策略的比较,数值分析以及老练型策略的一种修正。研究表明:1)随着零售商谈判实力的增强,保守型策略可能引发自有品牌产品质量"双重边际效应"问题;2)老练型策略虽可实现与谈判实力无关且等价于纵向集中控制下的最佳产品质量协同,但零售商并非总具备谈判实力条件;3)基于良好协商谈判的老练型策略的修正即可实现最佳的产品质量协同,又同时是各方的占优策略选择。

关键词: 谈判实力, 零售商自有品牌, 质量协同控制, 质量成本分摊

Abstract: Based on the Nash negotiation model, the strategy of the retailers' private brand product quality vertical cooperation is studied under the increase of the retailers' negotiations power, three types of product quality vertical collaboration are investigated,which are the conservative type strategy that retailer does not bear product quality cost, the adventure type strategy that retailer bear product quality cost completely and the sophisticated type strategy that retailer bear parts of the product quality cost, the Nash negotiations equilibrium solution of the optimal product quality, the optimal supply chain total profit and the optimal participants profit are obtained. And on this basis, the comparison of strategies above, numerical analysis, and the modification of the sophisticated type strategy are provided. The study shows that: 1)the conservative type strategy may even cause the double marginalization effect of the private brand quality with the increase of retailer negotiation power; 2)retailers do not always have the suitable conditions of negotiation strength to adopt the sophisticated type strategy, although it can realize the best product quality which is equivalent to the vertical integration control and negotiation power independent; 3)the modification strategy of the sophisticated type base on good will of negotiation proposed not only can realize best product quality coordination, but also can be the dominant strategy of retailer and manufacture.

Key words: negotiation power, retailers' private brand, quality cooperation, product quality cost allocation

中图分类号:

C931

陈瑞义, 琚春华, 盛昭瀚, 江烨. 基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(8): 63-74.

CHEN Rui-yi, JU Chun-hua, SHENG Zhao-han, JIANG Ye. Study of Retailers' Private Brand Supply Chain Quality Collaboration[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(8): 63-74.

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基于零售商自有品牌供应链质量协同控制研究

Study of Retailers' Private Brand Supply Chain Quality Collaboration

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