土地使用权机制的实现与执行

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.009

中国管理科学 ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (12): 71-76.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.009

土地使用权机制的实现与执行

张雪峰

北方工业大学经济管理学院, 北京 100144

收稿日期:2014-06-19 修回日期:2014-12-07 出版日期:2015-12-20 发布日期:2015-12-31
作者简介:张雪峰(1981-),男(汉族),四川万源人,北方工业大学经济管理学院,讲师,研究方向:博弈论与机制设计.
基金资助:
北方工业大学科研启动基金项目资助;国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301002);北京市青年英才计划(14076)

Realization and Implementation of Mechanism Design with Right in Land Use

ZHANG Xue-feng

Economics and Management School, North China University of Technology, Beijing 100144, China

Received:2014-06-19 Revised:2014-12-07 Online:2015-12-20 Published:2015-12-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 机制设计者的目的是想最优化一个基于环境参数空间的社会福利函数,但是有关环境参数的相关信息分散于经济之中,因此机制设计者既想收集尽可能多的相关信息,又想充分利用这些信息制定一个社会决策。机制通常在两个框架下讨论,分为实现和执行,两者本质区别在于后者利用了对策性思维方式。本文给出了土地使用权机制在二维信息传递空间下的实现问题,将激励相容条件引入信息有效的机制实现中,给出了占优均衡下的机制执行。研究发现:在实话实说假设下,能够降低信息传递空间维度,并且通过一个信息有效的机制来实现政府目标函数;参与人能够利用私有信息时,实话实说不能成为一个纳什均衡,但在占优均衡下可以通过机制来执行。

关键词: 机制设计, 实现, 占优均衡, 执行, 实话实说

Abstract: The objective of a mechanism designer is to optimize the social welfare function based on environment parameter spaces; however, relevant information about environment parameters is scattered in the economy. While mechanism designers would like to collect as much relevant information as possible, their aim is to make full use of the gathered information to develop a social decision. Mechanism is usually discussed under the framework or realization and implementation. The essential difference between these two frameworks is that the latter uses strategic interactions. The realization of mechanism with right in land use was discussed under a two dimensional message spaces. A mechanism can be designed to implement dominant equilibrium which addresses both information efficiency and incentive compatibility. The results showed that there exists a information efficient mechanism which can realize the goal function of government with truth-telling constraint. If the agents have private information, their truth-telling strategies may not be Nash equilibrium, but it could be a dominant equilibrium implemented by a mechanism.

Key words: mechanism design, realization, dominant equilibrium, implementation, truth-telling

中图分类号:

张雪峰. 土地使用权机制的实现与执行[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 71-76.

ZHANG Xue-feng. Realization and Implementation of Mechanism Design with Right in Land Use[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(12): 71-76.

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土地使用权机制的实现与执行

Realization and Implementation of Mechanism Design with Right in Land Use

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