关键词: 成本信息不对称, 混合渠道供应链, 零售商主导, 谎报

Abstract: With the development of society,an increasing number of supply chains consisting of manufacturers and retailers are dominated by large retailers, among which, some manufacturers begin to open direct channel to sale goods besides the traditional distribution channel. Vertical and horizontal competitions lead to the manufacturers to hide true cost information in pursuit of self-interest maximization. To discuss the misreporting impact on the supply chain, a hybrid channel supply chain is estabished, which is dominated by a common retailer who acts as the leader of Stackelberg game, and contains a manufacturer (Manufacturer 1) in a dual-channel supply chain and a manufacturer (Manufacturer 2) with only a traditional channel. First, the optimal pricing of the supply chain in the situation of cost information asymmetry and the manufacturers' optimal lied factor for the sake of profit maximization are discussed. Then, three misreporting strategies are compared with the situation of complete information respectively to analyze misreporting's impact on supply chain performance, and some conclusions are derived through MATLAB by a numerical example. The conclusions are: (1) Manufacturers will report their cost information higher than the true cost for profit maximization and different manufacturers' optimal lied factors have different relationship with the cross-price sensitivity and cost. (2) If the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is not very high, Manufacturer 1's reporting his cost information higher will reduce his own profit but increase Manufacturer 2's profit. If not, all the participants' profit will decrease. (3) That Manufacturer 2 reports his cost information higher is good for traditional channel of Manufacturer 1, but will hurt his direct channel. That Manufacturer 2 reports his cost information higher is bad for his own profit if the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is not very high, conversely, all the supply chain members will benefit. (4) If the two manufacturers both misreport their cost information, the profits of supply chain members and the whole supply chain will reduce. Furthermore, the bigger one manufacturer's lied factor is, the smaller his profit is and the smaller the whole profit is. Besides, the bigger the cross-price sensitivity of the customer is, the more obvious the change trend is. Theoretical system of the hybrid channel supply chain further and these conclusions can enhance the efficiency of the hybrid channel supply chain and provide decision-making basis for its participants can be improved in this paper.

Key words: cost information asymmetry, hybrid channel supply chain, retailer-dominated, misreporting