公平偏好如何影响开放式创新:一个基于计算经济学的研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.019

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文利用基于Agent的计算经济学方法和EWA学习模型,研究了不同公平偏好特征下创新主体对不同创新模式选择的问题。通过为Agent赋予四种不同的公平偏好类型:狭义的自利性偏好、竞争性偏好、差异厌恶性偏好和社会福利偏好,观察其在外向型开放式创新、内向型开放式创新、双向型开放式创新和封闭式创新四种创新策略之间的选择行为。研究结果表明:当创新主体具有狭义的自利性偏好时,封闭式创新和内向型开放式创新被选择的比例相当,并且多于外向型开放式创新和双向型开放式创新被选择的比例。当创新主体具有竞争性偏好时,封闭式创新被选择的比例又明显多于内向型开放式创新性。当创新主体具有差异厌恶性偏好时,外向型开放式创新被选择的比例也会明显减少,同时选择双向型开放式创新的主体基本消失。当创新主体具有社会福利偏好时,双向型开放式创新被选择的比例又会显著增加。

关键词: 公平偏好, 开放式创新, 基于Agent的计算经济学

Abstract: In this paper, how innovators of different fairness preference types choose their innovation strategies with the method of Agent-based Computational Economics and EWA learning model is analyzed. Through giving the agents different types of fairness preference (narrow self-interest type, competitive preference type, difference aversion type and social welfare preference type), agents' choosing behaviors among four kinds of innovation strategies are observed, such as inside-out open innovation, outside-in open innovation, coupled open innovation and closed innovation. The results showed that when the innovators possess the characteristic of narrow self-interest, the number of innovators who choose the strategy of closed innovation is the same as that who choose the strategy of outside-in open innovation, and they are more than numbers who choose the strategies of inside-out open innovation and coupled open innovation. When the innovators possess competitive preference, the ones who choose the strategy of closed innovation are more than those who choose the strategy of outside-in open innovation. When the innovators possess the characteristic of difference aversion, the innovators who choose the strategy of inside-out open innovation will reduce, who choose the strategy of coupled open innovation will nearly disappear. When the type of innovators is social welfare preferences, the innovators who choose the strategy of closed innovation can increase.

Key words: fairness preference, open innovation, agent-based computational economics

中图分类号:

F270

米捷, 林润辉. 公平偏好如何影响开放式创新:一个基于计算经济学的研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(12): 157-166.

MI Jie, LIN Run-hui. How Fairness Preference Affects Open Innovation: A Research Based on Agent-Based Computational Economics[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015, 23(12): 157-166.

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