基于有限理性消费者的竞争性退款保证策略

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.014

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (1): 116-123.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.01.014

基于有限理性消费者的竞争性退款保证策略

黄宗盛^1,2, 聂佳佳², 赵映雪³

1. 上海海事大学经济管理学院, 上海 201306;
2. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 四川成都 610031;
3. 对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院, 北京 100029

收稿日期:2013-06-17 修回日期:2014-01-21 出版日期:2016-01-20 发布日期:2016-01-28
通讯作者: 黄宗盛(1985-),男(汉族),四川绵阳人,上海海事大学经济管理学院讲师,研究方向:供应链管理,E-mail:chris163@yeah.net. E-mail:chris163@yeah.net
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301045,71511117,71440016)

Money-back Guarantees in the Presence of Bounded Rational Consumers

HUANG Zong-sheng^1,2, NIE Jia-jia², ZHAO Ying-xue³

1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;
3. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China

Received:2013-06-17 Revised:2014-01-21 Online:2016-01-20 Published:2016-01-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑有限理性消费者的前提下研究了低质和高质零售商关于退款保证的策略竞争。进一步将模型扩展到存在产品质量差异的情形,研究产品质量对双方策略的影响。研究表明:只有当有限理性消费者数量高于一定临界值时,提供退款保证才是有利可图的。在产品质量对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面为同时提供退款保证,且此时退款保证对低质企业更有利;而在产品质量非对称的市场上,零售商关于退款保证的均衡局面可能为低质企业不提供,高质企业提供或双方同时提供。此时退款保证更倾向于对高质企业有利。

关键词: 退款保证, 有限理性, Hotelling模型

Abstract: In this paper, the Hotelling model is utilized to examine the choice of MBG (money-back guarantees) for high-quality and low-quality retailers in the presence of bounded rational consumers. The equilibrium pricing strategy is found by the Nash equilibrium under four different MBG modes. And our model is extended to the setting in which incorporates the product quality and retail quality simultaneously. It is found that in a market with product quality symmetric, both firms offer the MBG in equilibrium and the MBG is beneficial to low-quality firm while unfavorable to high-quality firm. However, in a market with product quality asymmetric, the low-quality firm may not be willing to offer the MBG and the MBG is profitable for high-quality firm for most cases. The MBG can be profitable to low-quality firm only when the product quality difference is not so distinct and the quantity of bounded rational consumers is large enough.

Key words: money-back guarantees, bounded rationality, hotelling model

中图分类号:

F270

黄宗盛, 聂佳佳, 赵映雪. 基于有限理性消费者的竞争性退款保证策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(1): 116-123.

HUANG Zong-sheng, NIE Jia-jia, ZHAO Ying-xue. Money-back Guarantees in the Presence of Bounded Rational Consumers[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(1): 116-123.

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基于有限理性消费者的竞争性退款保证策略

Money-back Guarantees in the Presence of Bounded Rational Consumers

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