两种分成契约下供应链企业合作减排决策机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.03.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 61-70.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.03.008

两种分成契约下供应链企业合作减排决策机制研究

李友东¹, 谢鑫鹏², 营刚¹

1. 内蒙古大学经济管理学院, 内蒙古呼和浩特 010021;
2. 军事交通学院, 天津 300161

收稿日期:2014-03-12 修回日期:2014-11-19 出版日期:2016-03-20 发布日期:2016-03-18
通讯作者: 李友东(1978-),男(汉族),内蒙古呼和浩特市人,内蒙古大学经济管理学院讲师,博士,研究方向:供应链管理与优化、博弈论等,E-mail:nmglyd@163.com. E-mail:nmglyd@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71263033);内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2015MS0709);内蒙古大学高层次人才科研启动项目(135144)

Research on Supply Chain Collaboration Sharing Contract and Decision-making Mechanism under the Limitation of Carbon Emission

LI You-dong¹, XIE Xin-peng², YING Gang¹

1. School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot Inner Mongolia 010021, China;
2. Military Traffic Institute, Department of Automotive Engineering, Tianjin 300161, China

Received:2014-03-12 Revised:2014-11-19 Online:2016-03-20 Published:2016-03-18

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文考虑由一个受政府碳排放规制且处于供应链上游的产品供应商和处于下游的零售商所组成的低碳供应链系统。由于低碳消费需求增加所引起的零售商利润的提高,下游零售商可采取不同的契约形式促进上游供应商扩大减排投资。为此,本文考虑了分享减排所增收益与分担减排投资成本两种契约。通过建立零供两主体的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了在两种契约下主体的最优减排水平及最优分成比例,以及两主体在不同契约形式下的最优利润值。结果表明:分担减排投资成本契约能够使减排更加彻底,得到的减排水平较高;在分担减排投资成本契约下,两主体的利润值均会有所提高;在分享减排所增利润契约下,两主体的利润变化要依据参数来确定。最后,文章依据合理数据对上述结论进行了验证,并对碳交易价格等相关参数的敏感性进行了分析。

关键词: 碳规制及交易, 减排水平, 增值分享契约, 成本分担契约, 分成比例

Abstract: In this paper an emission-dependent supply chain system consisting of one single upstream emission-dependent manufacturer and one single downstream retailer is considered. Because its profit increases caused by the increased demand of low carbon consumption, retailer may conduct different contracts in order to promote the emission-dependent supplier to expand reduction investment. Therefore, two kinds of contract, which is called reduction increment income sharing contract and reduction investment cost sharing contract will be designed. Through the establishment of the two agents' Stackelberg game model, the optimal abatement levels and sharing rates can be obtained under the two different contracts, and two agents' optimal profits can also be calculated. The results show that reduction investment cost sharing contract can make the emission reduction more thoroughly and the obtained emission level is higher; in the reduction investment cost sharing contract, the two agents' profit will be increased; but in the reduction increment income sharing contract, the two agents' profit increments may be determined according to relevant parameters. Finally, based on the reasonable data the conclusions are verified, and the price of carbon emission permit and other related parameters' sensitivity can be analyzed.

Key words: carbon emission regulation and trade, emission reduction, reduction income sharing contract, reduction cost sharing contract, sharing rate

中图分类号:

F274

李友东, 谢鑫鹏, 营刚. 两种分成契约下供应链企业合作减排决策机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3): 61-70.

LI You-dong, XIE Xin-peng, YING Gang. Research on Supply Chain Collaboration Sharing Contract and Decision-making Mechanism under the Limitation of Carbon Emission[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(3): 61-70.

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两种分成契约下供应链企业合作减排决策机制研究

Research on Supply Chain Collaboration Sharing Contract and Decision-making Mechanism under the Limitation of Carbon Emission

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