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中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (8): 62-70.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.008

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

大气污染府际间合作治理联盟的达成与稳定——基于演化博弈分析

高明, 郭施宏, 夏玲玲   

  1. 福州大学经济与管理学院, 福建 福州 350116
  • 收稿日期:2014-11-17 修回日期:2015-06-17 出版日期:2016-08-20 发布日期:2016-08-24
  • 通讯作者: 高明(1965-),男(汉族),吉林农安人,福州大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:资源环境管理、区域经济,E-mail:gaoming65@163.com. E-mail:gaoming65@163.com
  • 基金资助:

    福建省社科规划项目(2014A035);福建省软科学研究项目(2017R01010062)

Analysis on the Formation and Stability of Cooperation Management Alliance of Air Pollution Control Among Local Governments: Based on the Evolutionary Game

GAO Ming, GUO Shi-hong, XIA Ling-ling   

  1. School of Economics and Administration, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, China
  • Received:2014-11-17 Revised:2015-06-17 Online:2016-08-20 Published:2016-08-24

摘要: 地方政府的大气污染治理模式主要有属地治理和合作治理模式,合作治理逐渐成为当前大气污染治理的共识。从演化博弈的视角,分析地方政府在大气污染治理中的行为演化路径与稳定策略,探究地方政府间达成并巩固合作治理联盟的因素。比较有中央约束和无中央政府约束下地方政府属地治理和合作治理四种演化博弈结果表明:在属地治理背景下,无论中央政府是否对地方政府进行约束,地方政府均倾向于“搭便车”行为,而中央政府对地方政府的约束在属地治理中面临失灵;在合作治理场景中,地方政府的稳定策略均向达成合作治理或均不治理的方向演进,但在中央政府约束下,地方政府的稳定策略能快速有效得向合作治理的方向演进。为实现大气污染的有效治理,地方政府间必须形成有效的合作治理联盟,合作收益是达成大气污染合作治理联盟的必要条件,而合作成本与中央政府约束的程度决定了合作治理联盟的稳定性。

关键词: 大气污染, 属地治理, 合作治理, 演化博弈

Abstract: At present, the air pollution control mode of local government includes territory management and cooperation management, and the experts have reached a consensus on the cooperation management of air pollution control. Based on the evolutionary game, the behavior evolutionary path and stability strategy of local governments in the process of air pollution control are analyzed, and then the factors of the formation and stability of cooperation management alliance among local governments are discussed.By compared the four situations of evolutionary game, including territory management without the restriction of central government, territory management with the restriction, cooperation management without the restriction, and cooperation management with the restriction, the result shows that territory management that might cause the free-rider problem against the air pollution control whether it is under the central government control or not,and the policy from central government would be dysfunctional in such a situation. On the other hand, local governments' behavior evolutionary path in the situations of cooperation management without the restriction of central government and the one with restriction are similar, the stability strategy is no governance or cooperation management. But with the restriction, local governments could form the cooperation management alliance efficiently and effectively. So in order to build the cooperation management alliance of air pollution control among local governments and make it stable, the central government should add restrictions to local governments in the process of air pollution control, and local governments need to improve the cooperation benefit and decrease the cooperation cost.

Key words: air pollution, territory management, cooperation management, evolutionary game

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