三级装备制造业供应链质量管理行为研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.03.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (3): 71-83.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.03.008

三级装备制造业供应链质量管理行为研究

孙健慧¹, 张海波², 赵黎明³

1. 天津商业大学会计学院, 天津 300134;
2. 北京师范大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100875;
3. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072

收稿日期:2016-09-07 修回日期:2016-12-20 出版日期:2018-03-20 发布日期:2018-05-24
通讯作者: 孙健慧(1989-),女(汉族),山东泰安人,天津商业大学会计学院讲师,博士,研究方向:协同创新、供应链管理,E-mail:sunjianhui@tjcu.edu.cn. E-mail:sunjianhui@tjcu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目（13CGL018）；天津市哲学社会科学规划资助项目（TJGLQN17-012）；天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目（17ZLZXZF00180）；天津市教委科研计划项目（161069）

Quality Control Behavior in the Three-echelon Equipment Manufacturing Supply Chain

SUN Jian-hui¹, ZHANG Hai-bo², ZHAO Li-ming³

1. School of Accounting, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin 300134, China;
2. School of Economics and Business Administration, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China;
3. School of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China

Received:2016-09-07 Revised:2016-12-20 Online:2018-03-20 Published:2018-05-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 作为我国工业化建设和国民经济发展的根本保证，供应链环境下装备制造企业的产品质量问题受到了广泛关注。本文重点考虑产品质量对供应链收益的影响，运用微分对策理论研究由单一制造商、单一部件供应商和单一零件供应商构成的三级装备制造业供应链质量管理行为的协调问题。通过对比Nash非合作博弈和Stackelberg主从博弈两种分散式决策模式及集中式决策模式下协同合作博弈的均衡结果，得到相关结论，并利用算例进行验证。研究表明，①分散式决策下，制造商的质量管理行为相同，但相比于Nash非合作博弈，Stackelberg主从博弈能够改善部件供应商和零件供应商的质量管理行为，提升供应链成员的收益水平；②集中式决策下，供应链成员的质量管理行为达到最优，系统整体收益实现最大。研究结论为装备制造业供应链成员间质量管理战略联盟的构建提供了理论依据。

关键词: 三级供应链, 微分对策, 装备制造业, 质量管理

Abstract: As the fundamental guarantee of industrialization construction and national economic development, the product quality control decision of the equipment manufacturing under the environment of supply chain has attracted a wide spread attention. Considering the impact of the product quality on the profit of supply chain, the paper tries to explore the coordination problem of quality control behaviors in the three-echelon equipment manufacturing supply chain consisted of a single manufacturer, a single component supplier and a single part supplier using differential game theory.Relevant conclusions are gained through comparing the equilibrium results of the decentralized decision models including Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg leader-follower game and the centralized decision model of coordinated cooperation game. Then the model is verified by a numerical analysis. The results indicate that,① the quality control behavior of the manufacturer remains the same in the decentralized decision models, but the Stackelberg leader-follower game is more effective than the Nash non-cooperative game to improve the quality control behaviors of the component supplier and the part supplier, as well as enhance the profits of the supply chain members;②the quality control behaviors of the supply chain members and the total profit of the supply chain achieve optimality in the centralized decision model. The research conclusions provide the theoretical basis for the construction of quality control strategic alliance among the equipment manufacturing supply chain members.

Key words: three-echelon supply chain, differential game, equipment manufacturing, quality control

中图分类号:

F224.3

孙健慧, 张海波, 赵黎明. 三级装备制造业供应链质量管理行为研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(3): 71-83.

SUN Jian-hui, ZHANG Hai-bo, ZHAO Li-ming. Quality Control Behavior in the Three-echelon Equipment Manufacturing Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(3): 71-83.

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三级装备制造业供应链质量管理行为研究

Quality Control Behavior in the Three-echelon Equipment Manufacturing Supply Chain

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