价格和成本波动对CoPS合约方不合作行为影响的演化分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.05.016

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在合同执行过程中因环境不确定性引发的违约行为，是导致复杂产品系统项目失败的重要原因。论文研究了环境波动（具体到市场价格波动和研制成本波动）对复杂产品系统合约方不合作行为的影响。首先研究了价格下降情况下买卖双方的收益函数、论证了收益函数中各变量与价格下降之间的逻辑关系，构建了复制动态方程、分析了用户不合作行为的演化路径和阈值与价格下降的关系；之后以同样的逻辑研究了价格上升情况下集成商的不合作行为；最后用数值仿真演示了初始条件改变和决策参数的不同取值对演化结果的影响。研究发现：（1）博弈双方收益函数中的各变量在价格下降时均是价格下降程度的函数，在价格上升时均是成本上涨程度的函数；（2）用户行为与价格下降的关系：当价格下降幅度小于用户合作阈值时合作是演化的结果，当价格下降幅度超过用户不合作阈值时不合作是演化的结果，当价格下降幅度界于合作阈值和不合作阈值之间时演化结果取决于对方的行为；（3）集成商行为与成本上升的关系：当成本上升幅度小于集成商合作阈值时合作是演化的结果，当成本上升幅度超过集成商不合作阈值时不合作是演化的结果，当成本上升幅度界于合作阈值和不合作阈值之间时演化结果取决于对方的行为。研究揭示了不合作行为与价格下降及成本上升的突变非线性关系，找出了合作和不合作的阈值。研究是环境不确定情境下合约治理理论在复杂产品系统及相关项目管理领域的深入，研究结果可为管理实践的合约治理提供决策支持，提高复杂产品系统项目的成功率。

关键词: 环境不确定性, 价格波动, 成本波动, 不合作行为, 合约治理, 复杂产品系统, 演化博弈

Abstract: Uncooperative behaviors of contractors caused by environmental uncertainty during contract conduction is one of the key factors which lead failure of Complex Products of System (CoPS) project. In this paper, effects on uncooperative behaviors of CoPS contractors caused by environmental fluctuation, which is divided into market price change and product cost change, are studied. Firstly the revenue functions of buyer and seller in the case of price decline are discussed, the logic relationship between each variables and price decline is revealed, constructs the replicator dynamics equation is constracted, the evolutionary path of user's uncooperative behavior is analyzed, and cooperative threshold and uncooperative threshold which are decided by the degree of price decline are concluded. And then the seller's uncooperative behavior in the case of cost up is analyzed in the same logic of price decline. Finally, numerical simulations are used to demonstrate the effects of different initial conditions of values on the evolutionary path. It is found that:(1) All the variables in revenue functions of both contractors are related with the degree of the price decline when price declining, and all the variables in revenue functions of both contractors are related with the degree of the cost up when cost growing. (2) The relationship between buyer's behavior and price decline:the evolutionary result is cooperative strategy when price decline is less than the threshold of buyer's cooperative strategy (we calls as "buyer's cooperative threshold"); the evolutionary result is uncooperative strategy when price decline is higher than the threshold of buyer's uncooperative strategy (we calls as "buyer's uncooperative threshold"); however, the evolutionary result depends on seller when price decline is between the "buyer's cooperative threshold" and the "buyer's uncooperative threshold". (3) The relationship between seller's behavior and cost up:the evolutionary result is cooperative strategy when cost up is less than the threshold of seller's cooperative strategy (we calls as "seller's cooperative threshold"); the evolutionary result is uncooperative strategy when cost up is higher than the threshold of seller's uncooperative strategy (we calls as seller's uncooperative threshold); however, the evolutionary result depends on buyer when cost up is between the "seller's cooperative threshold" and the "seller's uncooperative threshold". Study reveals the non-linear relationship between uncooperative behaviors and price falling or cost rising, and identifies the cooperative threshold and uncooperative threshold of both seller and buyer. The study provides a new perspective for contractual governance in CoPS and similar project management context under environment uncertainty. The study can provide decision support for management practice to improve the success rate of CoPS and similar project by governing uncooperative behavior caused by environment uncertainty.

Key words: environment uncertainty, price fluctuation, cost fluctuation, uncooperative behavior, contractual governance, complex product of systems (CoPS), evolutionary game

中图分类号:

陈占夺. 价格和成本波动对CoPS合约方不合作行为影响的演化分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(5): 157-168.

CHEN Zhan-duo. Evolutionary of Uncooperative Behaviors Caused by Price Change and Cost Change in Project of Complex Products of System[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(5): 157-168.

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