新兴智能回收下制造商转移定价决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1160

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对新兴智能回收，从闭环供应链渠道设计和回收定价角度，分别构建了单一回收渠道和双回收渠道下制造商一致和差异化转移定价决策模型，研究在制造商主导的闭环供应链中制造商的转移定价和最优利润决策问题。研究表明，相对于单一回收渠道，双回收渠道增加了产品回收率和供应链各成员利润；相对于差异化转移定价决策，制造商采取一致转移定价决策，能实现自身利润和智能回收商利润最大化，但会损害传统回收商利润，且不利于供应链其他成员利润的增长；当制造商采取差异化转移定价决策，虽不能实现自身利润最大，但相对于单一回收渠道，其利润也有所增长，也不会损害传统回收商利润，供应链其他成员的利润也会增长。

关键词: 智能回收, 第三方回收, 闭环供应链, 转移定价

Abstract: The smart recycling bin provides a new choice for consumers to recycle used products. However,the emergence of smart recycling channel brings the competition on the traditional collectors, and the manufacturer also face a new recycling market environment and re-adjusted the pricing strategy. According to the different channel participants in recycling channel, the smart recycling channel is considered as a third-party recycling. It is essentially different from those presented in previous models in which the third recycling channel was only considered as a whole, but the smart recycling channel in the third-party recycling is proposed in this paper. From the perspective of the channel design and pricing in closed-loop supply chain, three mathematical models are established under a single recycling channel and dual recycling channel, in which a uniform or a different transfer pricing for the manufacturer is considered. A Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is a leader and needs to decide the transfer price between smart collector and traditional collector is considered. Then numerical examples are proposed to analyze the effect of the parameters on the optimal results. Base on comparative analysis and numerical analysis, the research shows that:the recovery rate of collectors and profits of each member of the supply chain in dual recycling channel is higher than that of a single recycling channel. Comparing the different transfer pricing strategy in dual recycling channel, the manufacturer adopts uniform transfer pricing decision can maximize his profits and the smart collector' profits, but reduce the profits of retailer and the traditional collector. When the manufacturer adopts different transfer pricing strategies in dual recycling channel, the manufacturer's profit will increase compared with a single recycling channel,the profits of the traditional collector can maximize profits and the profits of other members in the supply chain will increase. The conclusion of this study provides a reference for the operation and management of the emerging smart recycling mode,and provide insights for the manufacturer in pricing decision andmanaging recycling channel.

Key words: smart recycling, third-party recycling, closed-loop supply chain, transfer pricing

中图分类号:

F724

蒋琼, 王勇, 刘名武. 新兴智能回收下制造商转移定价决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(9): 156-167.

JIANG Qiong, WANG Yong, LIU Ming-wu. Manufacturer's Transfer Pricing Decision under Emerging Smart Recycling[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(9): 156-167.

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