债券投标专利拍卖：均衡策略与期望收益

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.2035

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (6): 22-33.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.2035

债券投标专利拍卖：均衡策略与期望收益

时奇¹, 沈芳²

1.东华理工大学经济与管理学院，江西南昌330013；2.武汉大学质量发展战略研究院，湖北武汉430072

收稿日期:2019-12-19 修回日期:2020-06-28 出版日期:2022-06-20 发布日期:2022-06-24
通讯作者: 时奇(1979-)，男(汉族)，江西彭泽人，东华理工大学经济与管理学院，副教授，博士，研究方向：产业组织与机制设计，Email：qi.shi@foxmail.com. E-mail:qi.shi@foxmail.com
基金资助:
国家社科基金资助项目(17BJY026)

Debt-Bid Patent Auctions: Equilibrium Strategyand Expected Revenue

SHI Qi¹, SHEN Fang²

1. School of Economics and Management, East China University of Technology, Nanchang 330013, China;2. Institute of Quality Development Strategy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received:2019-12-19 Revised:2020-06-28 Online:2022-06-20 Published:2022-06-24
Contact: 时奇 E-mail:qi.shi@foxmail.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 债券投标是一种操作简易的证券投标，常用于成长型中小企业参与投标的专利拍卖。在债券投标专利拍卖中，获胜企业在其产业利润实现之后支付其报价，如果其产业利润还足以支付其报价，则支付其全部产业利润。本文建立了一个存在N个投标企业的拍卖模型，研究了在债券投标专利拍卖中，一价拍卖和二价拍卖下企业的均衡投标策略和专利持有者的期望收益，并将其与现金投标专利拍卖进行比较。研究结果发现，企业在债券投标专利拍卖中的均衡投标高于现金投标专利拍卖的均衡投标，且二价现金投标专利拍卖和二价债券投标专利拍卖的均衡投标策略不随企业类型分布的变化和参与企业个数的变化而变化；专利持有者在债券投标专利拍卖中获得的期望收益高于现金投标专利拍卖的期望收益；在债券投标专利拍卖中，二价债券投标专利拍卖的期望收益高于一价债券投标专利拍卖的期望收益。

关键词: 债券投标;专利拍卖;均衡策略;期望收益

Abstract: Debt-bid is a kind of simple security-bid, which is often used by growing SMEs to participate in patent auctions. In debt-bid patent auctions, the winning firm pays its bid after the realization of its industrial profits. If its industrial profits are not enough to pay its bid, it pays all its industrial profits. Then the patent holder does not get the total bidpromised by the winning firm. On the other hand, the bidding firmis protected by limited liability, thus the firms have incentives to bid aggressively. So, does debt-bid bring higher expected revenues to the patent holder than cash-bid?

Key words: debt-bid; patent auction; equilibrium strategy; expected revenue

中图分类号:

F224

时奇, 沈芳. 债券投标专利拍卖：均衡策略与期望收益[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(6): 22-33.

SHI Qi, SHEN Fang. Debt-Bid Patent Auctions: Equilibrium Strategyand Expected Revenue[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(6): 22-33.

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债券投标专利拍卖：均衡策略与期望收益

Debt-Bid Patent Auctions: Equilibrium Strategyand Expected Revenue

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