基于演化博弈的农村环境治理众筹机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2033

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 农村环境治理已经成为乡村振兴战略的一项重要任务，仅依靠政府单一治理主体无力应对全国70多万行政村的环境治理需求，发挥农户治理主体作用成为一种新的农村环境治理机制。本文将众筹模式引入环境治理中，采用演化博弈理论，在公平贡献和利他偏好两种情景下，分析有限理性农户决策行为演化动态，研究风险发生概率、亲环境偏好、团体效用、初始财富、融资目标、众筹份额等对环境治理众筹融资成功的影响。研究发现：公平贡献和利他偏好两种情形下，考虑环境污染给农户初始财富带来风险时，当初始财富期望损失、团体效用与声誉损失之和大于参与众筹的支出时，参与环境治理众筹成为农户的演化稳定策略。风险发生的概率越大、初始财富越多、参与众筹获得的群体认同价值越大、不参与时声誉损失越大，越有利于参与众筹策略成为农户的演化稳定策略。而在公平贡献模式下，当初始财富期望损失、团体效用与声誉损失之和小于参与众筹的支出时，农户群体中会出现不参与和不参与环境治理众筹两种策略共存的稳定均衡状态。通过对农户参与环境治理众筹成为演化稳定策略的内在机理分析，为农村环境治理众筹融资实践提供决策参考。

关键词: 农村环境治理, 演化博弈, 众筹, 复制动态方程

Abstract: Rural environmental governance is one of the important tasks of Rural Revitalization Strategy. The government alone is unable to meet the environmental governance needs of more than 700,000 administrative villages in China. It has become a new mechanism to play the role of the main body of farmers,this will fundamentally relieve the pressure on government finances. In this paper, the crowdfunding is introduced into the environmental governance. The evolutionary game models of two strategies for multiple players are constructed under two scenarios of fair contribution and altruistic preference. Then the effects of risk probability, environment-friendly preference, group utility, initial wealth, financing target and crowdfunding shares on crowdfunding success are analyzed, and the internal mechanism of the emergence of cooperative environmental governance behavior of farmers is revealed.

Key words: rural environmental governance, evolutionary game, crowdfunding, replicator dynamics equation

中图分类号:

F203.9

何奇龙, 罗兴, 陈力朋, 顾翠伶. 基于演化博弈的农村环境治理众筹机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(11): 170-181.

HE Qi-long, LUO Xing, CHEN Li-peng, GU Cui-ling. Crowdfunding Mechanism of Rural Environmental Governance Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(11): 170-181.

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