考虑奖惩机制和成本互担的众包物流服务质量最优控制

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0746

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究动态视角下服务平台和接包方如何控制众包物流服务质量的问题。引入众包物流服务质量标准，考虑奖惩机制和成本互担契约，构建了众包物流服务质量控制的微分博弈模型，利用庞特里亚金极大值原理求解出双方的最优质量控制水平、利润以及众包物流服务质量和需求随时间变化的最优轨迹。研究表明：服务价格在集中、分散和成本互担三种决策情形的物流服务过程中都保持不变；成本互担契约情形下，通过控制成本互担比例，服务质量、需求和总利润均能达到集中式情形的最优值，而且当奖惩因子满足一定条件时，双方利润相较于分散式情形都能得到改善；奖惩因子和佣金率的提高会增加接包方提升质量控制水平的积极性，但服务平台出于节约成本的目的会降低自身的质量控制水平，而仅依赖接包方较高的质量控制水平提高物流服务质量；当众包物流服务质量标准超过一定值时，奖惩因子的提高会造成服务平台利润的增加，接包方利润的减少。

关键词: 众包物流；服务质量；奖惩机制；成本互担；最优控制

Abstract: With the rapid development of sharing economy, crowdsouring logistics is emerging. However, the crowdsourcing logistics service quality is not high, which reduces the crowdsourcing logistics demand. It is a long-term process for crowdsourcing logistics service quality to be controlled by the service platform and the receriver, and the quality change is affected by the quality control level of both parties. Therefore, how to control crowdsourcing logistics service quality for service platform and receiver is studied from the dynamic perspective.

Key words: crowdsourcing logistics; service quality; reward-penalty mechanism; cost sharing; optimal control method

中图分类号:

F253.3

孟秀丽, 杨静, 吴一凡. 考虑奖惩机制和成本互担的众包物流服务质量最优控制[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(11): 182-195.

MENG Xiu-li, YANG Jing, WU Yi-fan. Optimal Control of Crowdsourcing Logistics Service Quality Considering Reward-penalty Mechanism and Cost Sharing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(11): 182-195.

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