损失规避与公平偏好对房地产征收补偿策略的影响

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0335

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 地方政府对土地财政依赖度高，土地征收与出让仍是市县级政府干预地方经济发展的最主要手段，现行房地产征收补偿制度设计忽略了主体策略互动与信念互动对征收补偿的影响。本文在行为博弈分析框架下，通过构建房地产征收主体的收益理论模型及蕴含损失规避和公平偏好的效用模型，研究损失规避与公平偏好对房地产征收补偿策略的影响。理论推演与数值模拟结果表明：一是征收补偿与被征收人的损失规避和公平偏好正相关，与征收人的损失规避负相关，与征收人的公平偏好正相关；二是被征收人接受征收的意愿越强，征收补偿越高。鉴于此，本文认为在房地产征收补偿制度设计上应充分考虑对人性的尊重，对现行房地产征收补偿价格进行行为偏好系数修正，降低征收人损失规避偏好、强化公平偏好、让被征收人公平共享土地增值收益，提高信息透明度推动被征收人对征收补偿的合理预期。

关键词: 损失规避；公平偏好；房地产征收；补偿策略

Abstract: Local governments still rely on land finance, the most important means of intervening in local economic development are land acquisition and transfer. The expropriation subject's strategic interaction and belief interaction on the levy compensation are ignored in the design of the current real estate levy compensation system. The subject’s preferences affect fair judgment on the compensation price. When the subject’s preferences are different, they will produce completely different fair judgment on the same compensation price. The land expropriation market is taken as an example, and the external utility of expropriation is considered. Under the assumption of pure self-interest, the theoretical models of the real estate expropriation subject's income are constructed. When the expropriator's income is maximized, the real estate expropriation area is analyzed, and when the expropriator's income is minimized, the expropriation compensation that the expropriator is willing to pay is analyzed. Based on the behavioral game theory, the utility models of the expropriation subjects under loss aversion and fairness preference are constructed. The influences of expropriation subject's loss avoidance and fairness preferences on real estate expropriation compensation strategies are studied. In order to more vividly analyze the influence of subject's behavior preferences on expropriation compensation strategies, specific land expropriation incident is used as case to carry out numerical simulation analysis by using MATLAB software. Theoretical deduction and numerical simulation results show that: (1) the expropriation compensation is positively related to the loss avoidance and fairness preference of the expropriated, and is negatively related to the loss avoidance of the expropriator, and is positively related to the fairness preference of the expropriator; (2) the stronger the willingness of the expropriated to accept the expropriation, the higher the compensation. In view of this, the respect for human nature should be considered in the design of the real estate levy compensation system, and the following measures will help promote the harmonious implementation of real estate collection: to modify the behavior preference coefficients of the current real estate expropriation compensation price; to reduce the loss avoidance preference of the requisitioned person, strengthen the fair preference, and allow the requisitioned person to share the land value-added income fairly; to improve information transparency and promote reasonable expectations of expropriated people for expropriation compensation.

Key words: loss avoidance; fair preference; real estate collection; compensation strategies

中图分类号:

F293.3

赵旭, 洪开荣, 孙倩. 损失规避与公平偏好对房地产征收补偿策略的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(12): 268-279.

ZHAO Xu, , , HONG Kai-rong, SUN Qian,. Impact of Loss Aversion and Fair Preference on Real Estate Collection Compensation Strategies[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(12): 268-279.

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