食品安全危机预测下食品供应链动态策略制定及协调

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1368

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 116-131.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1368

食品安全危机预测下食品供应链动态策略制定及协调

胡劲松, 刘玉红, 马德青

青岛大学商学院，山东青岛266071

收稿日期:2020-07-16 修回日期:2021-01-10 出版日期:2023-05-20 发布日期:2023-05-23
通讯作者: 胡劲松(1966-)，男(汉族)，湖北京山人；青岛大学商学院，教授，博士生导师，研究方向：行为运营管理，Email：hujinsong@qdu.edu.cn. E-mail:hujinsong@qdu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771129)

Research on Food Supply Chain Dynamic Strategy Formulation and Coordination under the Prediction of Food Safety Crisis

HU Jin-song, LIU Yu-hong, MA De-qing

School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

Received:2020-07-16 Revised:2021-01-10 Online:2023-05-20 Published:2023-05-23
Contact: 胡劲松 E-mail:hujinsong@qdu.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑食品安全危机的突发性，利用随机停止模型将食品安全危机纳入食品供应链系统，构建了食品安全危机预测情形下供应商和制造商的微分博弈模型，借助连续动态规划理论求得了集中、分散、制造商成本分担、供应商成本分担四种模式下企业的最优策略和利润。研究发现，食品安全危机直接影响危机前质量和营销策略的制定，鉴于潜在危机的存在，企业会降低危机前的投入以抵消预期的利润损失；同时会根据损害率的高低决定危机后策略的增减变化，进而影响危机后食品安全信任度、商誉及利润的变化趋势。此外，制造商的成本分担行为能够同时实现制造商和供应商利润的帕累托改进，而供应商的成本分担契约仅利于自身利润的提升，对制造商及整个供应链利润的改善作用与外界环境因素有关。结合数值算例发现，潜在食品安全危机不会改变两种契约的有效性，但会削弱契约对利润的改善效果，而且相比于制造商成本分担契约，供应商成本分担契约的影响更易受到危机的冲击。

关键词: 食品安全危机预测；食品供应链；成本分担；微分博弈

Key words: food safety crisis prediction; food supply chain; cost-sharing; differential game

中图分类号:

F224

胡劲松, 刘玉红, 马德青. 食品安全危机预测下食品供应链动态策略制定及协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(5): 116-131.

HU Jin-song, LIU Yu-hong, MA De-qing. Research on Food Supply Chain Dynamic Strategy Formulation and Coordination under the Prediction of Food Safety Crisis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(5): 116-131.

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食品安全危机预测下食品供应链动态策略制定及协调

Research on Food Supply Chain Dynamic Strategy Formulation and Coordination under the Prediction of Food Safety Crisis

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