零售商引入扶贫产品的策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0227

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (6): 25-38.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0227

零售商引入扶贫产品的策略研究

冯春¹, ², 何征¹, 郭倩芸¹, 张怡³

1.西南交通大学交通运输与物流学院，四川成都610000； 2.西南交通大学综合交通运输智能化国家地方联合工程实验室，四川成都610000；3.西南交通大学电气工程学院，四川成都610000

收稿日期:2021-02-01 修回日期:2021-05-18 出版日期:2023-06-20 发布日期:2023-06-17
通讯作者: 何征（1986-），女（汉族），四川南充人，西南交通大学运输与物流学院,博士研究生，研究方向: 供应链管理，Email:31768809@qq.com. E-mail:31768809@qq.com
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金资助项目（17BGL085）

Strategies of Retailer Introducing Poverty Alleviation Products

FENG Chun¹, ², HE Zheng¹, GUO Qian-yun¹, ZHANG Yi³

1. School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610000, China; 2. National United Engineering Laboratory of Integrated and Intelligent Transportation, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610000, China; 3. School of Electrical Engineering, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610000, China

Received:2021-02-01 Revised:2021-05-18 Online:2023-06-20 Published:2023-06-17
Contact: 何征 E-mail:31768809@qq.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 零售商引入扶贫产品有助于扶贫产品建立稳定的销售渠道，进而促进贫困地区产业化发展，提升消费扶贫的成效和稳定性。然而零售商作为理性人，是否引入扶贫产品，引入之后采用何种定价策略，是经过一系列博弈后的结果。本文从扶贫产品道义特性入手，捕获其对市场需求产生的影响，进而构建零售商主导的二级供应链博弈模型，以此探讨零售商的产品引入策略和定价策略。研究发现，采取双产品策略对零售商有益，因此零售商会乐意引入扶贫产品，而不同的定价策略对市场需求及供应链成员的收益产生不同影响。各供应链成员偏好的定价策略与实际市场特征有关。总体而言，采用扶贫产品定价高于常规产品的定价策略，十分利于扶贫产品供应商，而对常规产品供应商影响则较小，因此该定价策略有助于消费扶贫。而增强社会的扶贫氛围则有助于零售商选择该定价策略。但是两种产品的价格差距必需限定在某个范围之内，否则高价格产品将被排挤出市场。

关键词: 消费扶贫;消费偏好;Stackelberg博弈;产品策略;定价策略

Abstract: “Poverty alleviation through consumption” is a form of poverty reduction whereby all sectors of society can help increase the income of poor individuals by consuming products and services from impoverished areas. It is an important way for social entities to participate in poverty reduction. Retailers can promote the establishment of stable supply chains for poverty alleviation products by introducing and selling such products. One of the motivations behind this behavior is to increase profits. Retailers can adopt different product and pricing strategies, which can have varying impacts on supply chain participants and the effectiveness of poverty alleviation through consumption. The objective of this paper is to study these strategies and their impact to gain management insights. Currently, there are few literature resources on poverty alleviation through consumption, most of which focus on qualitative research. It aims to model the market characteristics of poverty alleviation products for the first time and illustrate the impact of moral attributes of poverty alleviation products on market equilibrium. The significance of this study lies in enhancing the theoretical foundation of poverty alleviation through consumption.

Key words: poverty alleviation by consumption; consumer preference; Stackelberg game; product strategy; pricing strategy

中图分类号:

F325.2

冯春, 何征, 郭倩芸, 张怡. 零售商引入扶贫产品的策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(6): 25-38.

FENG Chun, HE Zheng, GUO Qian-yun, ZHANG Yi. Strategies of Retailer Introducing Poverty Alleviation Products[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(6): 25-38.

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零售商引入扶贫产品的策略研究

Strategies of Retailer Introducing Poverty Alleviation Products

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