关键词: 二手电子产品, 质量信息, 第三方保修商, 逆向选择, 道德风险

Abstract:

With the rapid development of science and technology and economy， as well as the increasing demand for sustainable development and green environmental protection， the second-hand electronics market is growing rapidly. There is a serious asymmetry of product quality information between retailers and consumers， between retailers and the third-party warranty provider （3WP） in the second-hand electronics market. Accurate second-hand product quality information is difficult to obtain， and the high risk costs faced by consumers has seriously restricted the rapid and healthy development of the second-hand electronics market. Due to the decentralization of individual consumer decision-making， it is difficult to design an effective incentive strategy for the incentive subject， so as to urge retailers to provide real and accurate product quality information.In response to this problem， due to the advantages of 3WP such as high professionalism and better stability， 3WP is taken as the incentive subject. Based on the analysis of the impact of the authenticity and accuracy of the quality information of second-hand electronic products on the revenue of the 3WP， combined with the profit sharing contract mechanism， a principal-agent model considering moral hazard and adverse selection between 3WP and retailer is constructed， in view of the situation that retailers hide their quality inspection efforts and quality inspection information. The maximum principle is used to solve the problem， the optimal profit sharing contract is obtained， and an effective incentive strategy is designed to encourage retailers to disclose the real information of product quality.Through model analysis and example analysis of the problem， it is found that： （1） 3WP has homogenous with consumers for the authenticity and accuracy of the quality information of second-hand electronics disclosed by retailers. 3WP， as an incentive subject， can facilitate the design of second-hand electronic product quality information incentive strategies； （2） 3WP can encourage retailers to provide real and accurate quality information of second-hand electronic products by designing continuous contracts with fixed payment and profit sharing ratio；（3） The profit of 3WP and retailers decreases as the quality of second-hand electronic products decreases. Therefore， both 3WP and retailers prefer higher-quality second-hand electronic products；（4） Under the continuous incentive mechanism， 3WP can select retailers with lower marginal cost of quality testing to participate in cooperation by adjusting the design of incentive contracts， thereby achieving the effect of further promoting the healthy development of the second-hand electronics market. （5） The 3WP proposed in this paper has an incentive mechanism for the quality information of second-hand electronic products. For a certain scope of application， when the quality and price sensitivity coefficient of second-hand electronic products exceeds a certain threshold， the above-mentioned incentive mechanism will lose its effect. In response to this situation， it is necessary to seek new incentive mechanisms to achieve effective incentives for retailers.Numerical analysis based on the parameters that fit the actual conditions verifies that 3WP can provide effective incentives for the retailer’s true disclosure of product quality information by appropriately setting the incentive parameters in the sharing plan. It can enhance consumer confidence in the second-hand market and promote the healthy development of the second-hand market.

Key words: second-hand electronic products, quality information, third-party warranty providers, adverse selection, moral hazard