关键词: 押金返还制度, 闭环供应链, 制造商竞争, 非合作-合作两型博弈

Abstract:

The rapid development of China's economy has made the industry's characteristics of “high energy consumption and high emissions” increasingly prominent. Rapid industrialization has inevitably led to serious conflicts between China's economic development and environmental performance， and problems such as ecological deterioration and resource depletion continue to emerge. With the continuous enhancement of public awareness of environmental protection， the economic and environmental benefits generated by the recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and closed-loop supply chains have gradually been valued and recognized by all sectors of society. But the profits brought by remanufacturing activities to manufacturers are not enough to motivate them to actively participate in recycling and remanufacturing production activities， and the government can play a promoting role. Hereby， how the members of the closed-loop supply chain can simultaneously optimize pricing decisions and profit distribution when the government implements the deposit return system for recyclers has become an interesting issue.In this paper， a noncooperative-cooperative biform game of a closed-loop supply chain with a recycler and two competing manufacturers is established under the deposit return system implemented to recycler by the government， and the influence of deposit refund system on member strategy selection and profit distribution in the closed-loop supply chain is studied. A supply chain transaction model that integrates the non-cooperative part and the cooperative part is constructed through coupling integration of cooperative game and non-cooperative game. In the non-cooperative part， continuous price strategy of two manufacturers which named situation in the closed-loop supply chain is constructed. Then the Nash equilibrium is used to analyze manufacturer's optimal price strategy and optimal profit of members when considering the payment value from the cooperative part. In the cooperation part， von Neumann alliance characteristic function and Shapley value are used to analyze the decision-making and profit distribution of the closed-loop supply chain under any competition situation formed by the non-cooperative part. Finally， a numerical analysis is given to illustrate how deposit or other factors affect the members’ optimal decision of the noncooperative-cooperative biform game under the deposit return system， which reflects the effect of the deposit return system on recycler.The results show that （1） The return of the deposit to the recycler increases the product recovery rate and the sales price， which promotes the recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and the profitability of supply chain members， but the government should pay attention to the reasonable setting of the deposit. （2） Recycling difficulty and cost of recycling influence decisions of recyclers and manufacturers. Excessive difficulty or high cost is not conducive to recycling and remanufacturing. Hence， enterprise managers should consider appropriate recycling strategies and upgrade their technology accordingly. （3） The cost advantage of recycling and remanufacturing can provide an incentive for manufacturers to take an active part in recycling and remanufacturing， and thus reap higher benefits.

Key words: deposit refund system, closed-loop supply chain, manufacturer competition, noncooperative-cooperative biform game