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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (4): 176-186.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0292cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0292

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成本扰动下服务供应链的质量承诺决策及协调研究

王文隆1,任倩楠2,朱玉春1,刘天军1()   

  1. 1.西北农林科技大学经济管理学院, 陕西 杨凌 712100
    2.西安建筑科技大学管理学院, 陕西 西安 710055
  • 收稿日期:2021-02-09 修回日期:2021-07-08 出版日期:2024-04-25 发布日期:2024-04-25
  • 通讯作者: 刘天军 E-mail:ltj168168@nwsuaf.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72102185);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(2452021113);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划青年项目(2021JQ-518)

Quality Guarantee Decision and Coordination of Service Supply Chain with Cost Disruption

Wenlong Wang1,Qiannan Ren2,Yuchun Zhu1,Tianjun Liu1()   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, China
    2.School of Management, Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology, Xi’an 710055, China
  • Received:2021-02-09 Revised:2021-07-08 Online:2024-04-25 Published:2024-04-25
  • Contact: Tianjun Liu E-mail:ltj168168@nwsuaf.edu.cn

摘要:

成本扰动会打破服务供应链的原有均衡状态,服务质量承诺作为吸引顾客的有效策略必然会受其影响而发生变化。基于此,本文将质量承诺考虑在内,构建由提供商和集成商组成的服务供应链系统,分析集中式和分散式决策下集成商成本扰动前后服务供应链的均衡决策,并设计收益共享契约进行协调。研究发现:(1)扰动较小时,服务价格、质量承诺水平和服务容量具有鲁棒性;正扰动较大时,服务价格递增,质量承诺水平和服务容量递减;负扰动较大时,服务价格递减,质量承诺水平和服务容量递增。(2)若正扰动较大,则集成商愿意调整初始决策;若负扰动较大,则提供商愿意调整原有策略。(3)集中式供应链利润和集成商利润随成本变化而改变,而提供商利润存在稳健区。(4)收益共享契约可以协调成本扰动前后质量承诺下的服务供应链,并实现帕累托最优。

关键词: 质量承诺, 成本扰动, 服务供应链, 协调

Abstract:

Cost Disruption inevitably breaks the equilibrium of the service supply chain, and service quality guarantee as an effective strategy to attract customers is affected by it. In the volatile economic climate, original quality guarantee should be modified to alleviate the negative impact of cost disruption on a service supply chain. The majority of the existing researches into cost disruption just focus on product supply chains, and only a few pay attentions to service supply chains, which all ignore the coordination with cost disruption. The gap between theoretical research and management practice indicates that it is imperative to analyze quality guarantee and coordination in service supply chains with cost disruption. Therefore, quality guarantee is taken into consideration in this paper. A service supply chain system consisting of a provider and an integrator is constructed. The equilibrium decisions of service supply chain are analyzed before and after the integrator’s cost disruption under centralized and decentralized decisions. Furthermore, the revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the service supply chain with cost disruption. The results show that (a) when the disruption is small, the service price, quality guarantee level and service capacity are robust; when the positive disruption is big, the service price increases, the quality guarantee and service capacity decrease; when the negative disruption is big, the service price decreases, the quality guarantee and service capacity increase. (b) If the positive disruption is big, the integrator is willing to adjust original decisions; if the negative disruption is big, the provider is willing to adjust original decisions. (c) The profits for centralized supply chain and integrator vary according to the change of cost, while provider’s profit has certain robustness. (d) The revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the service supply chain before and after the cost disruption, and achieve Pareto optimality. In this paper, quality guarantee is introduced into the research of service supply chain with cost disruption, and expands related research, which has certain theoretical value and practical significance.

Key words: quality guarantee, cost disruption, service supply chain, coordination

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