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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 109-119.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1516

• • 上一篇    

考虑转诊率的健康服务质量及定价决策研究

贾俊秀,侯毅姝,杜黎()   

  1. 西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西 西安 710071
  • 收稿日期:2021-08-03 修回日期:2022-01-20 出版日期:2024-06-25 发布日期:2024-07-03
  • 通讯作者: 杜黎 E-mail:duli@xidian.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171186);陕西省自然科学基金项目(2021JM-145);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(16XJA630003)

Service Quality and Pricing Decision of Health Operation with Referral Rate

Junxiu Jia,Yishu Hou,Li Du()   

  1. School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi'an 710071,China
  • Received:2021-08-03 Revised:2022-01-20 Online:2024-06-25 Published:2024-07-03
  • Contact: Li Du E-mail:duli@xidian.edu.cn

摘要:

针对大健康背景下我国健康服务机构与医疗机构间的转诊等健康服务供应链的关键运营问题,建立考虑消费者效用的健康服务供应链决策模型。基于我国健康服务系统运营实践,构建由健康复杂度与健康服务质量直接影响的转诊率函数,分析健康服务机构定价、服务质量以及医疗机构服务质量决策,讨论转诊服务费对主体决策的影响。就转诊服务费引起的不协调性,给出惩罚契约与成本共担契约协调策略。研究发现:(1)集中决策下,供应链可对健康服务质量、医疗服务质量和服务定价进行同时最优决策;若先决策两类服务质量,则健康服务价格会随两类服务质量的提升而增加;若先决策医疗服务质量,则健康服务质量与医疗服务质量负相关。供应链的服务质量均随健康复杂度的增加而提升,其与健康服务价格均随转诊系数的增加而降低。(2)分散决策下,医疗服务质量的提升除了受健康服务质量降低影响,其最优决策还由转诊服务费决定,但与健康服务价格无关;在给定运营条件下,健康服务质量、医疗服务质量及供应链总利润均随转诊服务费的增加而降低;健康服务机构利润随转诊服务费增加而减小,而医疗机构利润则先增加后减少。(3)在一定条件下,惩罚契约可以改善供应链效益但不能实现供应链协调,成本共担契约可以实现健康服务供应链协调。

关键词: 健康服务供应链, 服务质量, 定价, 转诊率

Abstract:

Due to the improvement of people's health awareness and implement of the ‘Big Health’ government strategy, lots of health service institutions have been established one after another and a new kind of health service supply chain forms in China. The key operation problems in these supply chains, such as service pricing and quality of health service institution and service quality of hospital, are studied innovatively based on the referral between health service institutions and hospitals in the paper.A patient utility model, centralized and decentralized supply chain operations model are built for analyzing the impact of referral service fee on the optimal pricing, service quality and profit. The function of referral rate is this paper’s highlight which is related to health complexity and health service quality. Because the health service supply chain’s efficiency is lowered by the existence of referral service fee, the coordination of supply chain is dealt with by the penalty contract and cost sharing contract.It is found that (1) in a centralized health service supply chain, the optimal health service quality, medical service quality and service pricing can be obtained simultaneously. When health service quality and medical service quality are first determined, the health service price is increased with two service quality above. And then if the medical service quality is first determined, health service quality is negatively correlated with it. Two kind of service qualities are decreased with the health complexity. Health service quality is negatively correlated with referral rate, and health service price and medical service quality are decreased with referral rate. (2) In the decentralized health service supply chain, the medical service quality is decreased with that of health and related with referral service fee, but it is independent of the health service price. Given some an operation condition, the health service quality, medical service quality and the overall profit of the supply chain is decreased with the referral service fee. The profit of health service institutions is also decreased with the referral service fee, while that of hospital is first increased and then decreased. (3) Under a condition, the Pareto improvement of the health service supply chain can be achieved by the penalty contract, but the coordination cannot be realized. While the health service supply chain can be coordinated by the cost sharing contract.

Key words: health service supply chain, service quality, pricing, referral rate

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