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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 267-280.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1391cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1391

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集团采购供应链的合作竞争与企业社会责任激励

周茂森1,2,张庆宇1,2()   

  1. 1.深圳大学管理学院, 广东 深圳 518060
    2.深圳大学商业分析与供应链研究所, 广东 深圳 518060
  • 收稿日期:2021-07-14 修回日期:2022-03-21 出版日期:2024-06-25 发布日期:2024-07-03
  • 通讯作者: 张庆宇 E-mail:q.yu.zhang@gmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AGL014);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20YJA630098);广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD19CGL38)

Incentives for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Group-purchasing Supply Chain under Cooperation and Competition

Maosen Zhou1,2,Qingyu Zhang1,2()   

  1. 1.College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China
    2.Research Institute of Business Analytics and Supply Chain Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China
  • Received:2021-07-14 Revised:2022-03-21 Online:2024-06-25 Published:2024-07-03
  • Contact: Qingyu Zhang E-mail:q.yu.zhang@gmail.com

摘要:

消费者的社会责任(SR)意识日增,但未必能为企业SR行为买单,因而企业SR投入可能无法换取可持续回报,有必要为企业SR实践探索有别于依赖消费者支付意愿的战略性驱动。为此,以集团采购模式为例,即两个竞争性制造商通过集团采购组织(GPO)实现采购合作,构建合作竞争下关注消费者利益的SR战略博弈模型,识别SR行为对运营决策的影响;基于博弈均衡,揭示集团采购对SR战略及其可持续性的影响,并提出集团采购的可持续价值创造路径。研究发现: 制造商履行SR能提升产量,有利于GPO和消费者,但仅在合作主导时对自身有利,而供应链与社会福利可能在SR水平适度时同时改进,也可能在SR水平过高时同时受损;合作与竞争失衡是制造商制定SR战略的决定性因素,制造商在竞争主导时因陷入“囚徒困境”而制定SR战略,而只有在合作主导时通过SR战略获利,并实现社会福利的帕累托改进;相对于独立采购,集团采购既能因共享购买力而创造合作价值,也能因考虑SR战略而创造SR价值。特别地,当竞争强度和采购佣金较低时,还能因支持SR战略而产生社会效益。突出论证了集团采购与SR在可持续价值创造上的相互促进作用,并为SR实践提出新的战略性驱动力。

关键词: 企业社会责任, 合作竞争, 利他主义, 集团采购, 囚徒困境

Abstract:

Although consumers are concerned about social responsibility (SR), they may not be willing to pay for corporate SR behavior in actual purchases. However, most of the literature has examined the incentives for corporate SR based on reciprocity with consumers rather than altruism towards consumers. It is necessary to explore new drivers, which are different from consumers' willingness to pay, for corporations to engage in SR, especially when consumers have insufficient awareness of SR behavior or their actual willingness to pay is not so sensitive to SR attributes of products. To narrow this gap, a supply chain where two competing manufacturers purchase a same component through a common group purchasing organization (GPO) to achieve economies of scale is studied. The manufacturers can endogenously make SR strategies simultaneously by choosing how much consumer surplus should be considered in their production decisions. By developing a stylized model to analyze the coopetition game between the manufacturers with respect to SR level and quantity decisions, the impact of SR levels on operational performance is identified and the equilibrium SR strategies are solved. From this, the impact of group purchasing on SR incentives and their sustainability is untangled, and the sustainable path of group purchasing to value creation is explored.The results indicate that SR can always benefit the GPO and consumers by increasing production while it can benefit the manufacturers only if cooperation dominates. As a result, SR can make both the supply chain and social welfare either better off at low levels or worse off at high levels. In equilibrium, the manufacturers will implement SR strategies only if cooperation and competition are unbalanced. In this scenario, the manufacturers may sink into Prisoner’s Dilemma and suffer losses from SR strategies if competition dominates, whereas SR strategies can also make the manufacturers better off and achieve the Pareto improvement of social welfare if cooperation dominates. Compared to individual purchasing, group purchasing can create values of cooperation and SR by inducing the share of purchasing power and a cooperative relationship between the manufacturers. In particular, when the competition intensity and GPO commission are sufficiently low, group purchasing can sustain SR strategies and thus creates significant social benefit, i.e., improve the consumer surplus and social welfare at the same time. Above all, by demonstrating the mutual promotion on sustainable value creation between group purchasing and corporate SR, we propose a new strategic driver of SR for corporations under competition.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, coopetition, altruism, group purchasing, prisoner’s dilemma

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