关键词: 共性技术, 供给决策, 市场化开发, 联合研究, 博弈论

Abstract:

General Purpose Technologies （GPTs） were seen as the development engines of industries and whole countries. However， as a pre-competition technology， GPTs needs market-oriented development in order to realize its potential value after supply. Due to the characteristics of long R&D cycle， continuous investment and hard to monopolize revenue， GPTs are liable to fall into “market failure” and “organization failure” of supply. In addition， in the stage of market-oriented development， it may face the “system failure” and “market failure”， and even faces the multiple failure phenomenon of of interlacing with multiple failure types. How to alleviate GPTs R&D failures has become an important issue to be studied and solved. In order to avoid the possible failures in the process of GPTs R&D， it is necessary to combine GPTs supply with market-oriented development. The classic AJ Model is used for reference， the link between the supply and market-oriented development of GPTs is highlighted， and a two-stage game model of GPTs supply with Cournot competition between enterprises in the stage of market-oriented development is established. In the market-oriented development stage， enterprises respectively produce GPTs-based products to maximize their profits， while in the GPTs supply stage， they make decisions under different supply models. Then the supply decisions and its influence factors problem are revealed for duopoly enterprises which faces independent research （Scenario Ⅰ）， research/imitation （Scenario Ⅱ） and Research Joint Venture （RJV， Scenario Ⅲ）. The main results are as follows： the technical attribute of GPTs， which is more basic or applied， is an important influence factors on the decision-making of GPTs supply for duopoly enterprises， and it is also affected by the net cost coefficient of GPTs supply. For Scenario Ⅰ and Scenario Ⅱ， if the basic characteristic is obvious， the duopoly enterprises will choose ScenarioⅠ， and if the applied characteristic is obvious， then choose Scenario Ⅱ. For ScenarioⅠ and Ⅲ， Scenario Ⅱ and Ⅲ， the technical attributes of GPTs and the collaboration degree of RJV are the basic factors that affect the decision-making of GPTs supply. According to the technical attributes （basic attribute and application attribute） of GPTs and the collaboration degree （small collaboration degree and large collaboration degree） of RJV， a four-quadrant analysis matrix is established. In addition， the technical attribute of GPTs has an firstly ascended and then descended effect on the profit of duopoly enterprises in Scenario Ⅰ， and the government subsidy weakens the negative effect of net supply cost on the profit， but does not change the impact trajectory of the technical attribute. According to the research conclusions， policy suggestions are put forward to choose the supply mode of GPTs from two aspects of weighing the technical attribute of GPTs and the collaboration degree of RJV， so as to promote the GPTs supply and the market-oriented development. These will stimulate the enthusiasm of enterprise research， cultivate the market-oriented development product of GPTs， help to connect the supply chain and promote GPTs R&D. The classic AJ model is used to describe the market competition environment and it is applied to the innovation situation of GPTs， and the supply decision of GPTs is explored for market-oriented development. The decision-making game models of GPTs supply under three situations provide enlightenment for the in-depth study in the GPTs fields， and the policy suggestions provid reference for the decision-making of enterprises undertaking GPTs R&D and government department.

Key words: GPTs, supply decisions, market-oriented development, RJV, game theory