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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (12): 194-205.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.2096

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自定义还是默认?平台多点竞争中跨市场服务提供策略研究

王保骄, 李治文(), 卢艺, 熊强   

  1. 江苏大学管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013
  • 收稿日期:2023-12-12 修回日期:2024-03-23 出版日期:2024-12-25 发布日期:2025-01-02
  • 通讯作者: 李治文 E-mail:zhiwenli@ujs.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(19BGL263)

Customizing or Default? Study on Cross-Market Service Providing Strategy of Platforms in Multimarket Competition

Baojiao Wang, Zhiwen Li(), Yi Lu, Qiang Xiong   

  1. School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China
  • Received:2023-12-12 Revised:2024-03-23 Online:2024-12-25 Published:2025-01-02
  • Contact: Zhiwen Li E-mail:zhiwenli@ujs.edu.cn

摘要:

近年来,平台跨界经营展开多点竞争的现象频现,平台如何在多点竞争中提供跨市场服务引发社会关注。本文基于Hotelling模型构建了两个平台针对商家和跨市场服务偏好异质的消费者在两个不同市场中的多点竞争模型,探究平台在向消费者提供跨市场服务时选择自定义策略还是默认策略的决策问题。研究表明:(1)相对于实施相异的策略,两平台实施相同的策略并不一定总是导致激烈的价格竞争,也可能引发更为缓和的价格竞争;(2)两平台均实施默认策略,一个平台实施自定义策略而一个平台实施默认策略,两平台均实施自定义策略,均可能成为平台跨市场服务提供策略纳什均衡,取决于平台交叉网络外部性和跨市场服务喜厌消费者的比例;(3)一个或两个平台实施默认策略,均有可能导致最高的社会总福利;而两平台均实施自定义策略,则导致最低的社会总福利。

关键词: 双边市场, 平台多点竞争, 跨市场服务偏好, 隐私保护, 平台监管

Abstract:

Platform cross-market operation has become more and more popular in recent years, and how platforms provide cross-market service in multimarket competition has aroused widespread social concern. Based on the Hotelling model, a multimarket competition system between two platforms serving sellers and consumers is built with different cross-market service preferences in two different markets, and the decision-making issue of platforms is examined from two available options: implementing the customizing strategy or the default strategy when providing cross-market services to consumers. The following findings are derived by the analysis. (1) Platforms price competition does not always tend to be fiercer when the same strategy is chosen by platforms than when the different strategies are chosen. Under some circumstance, it tends to be more relaxed. (2) Three situations, which are both platforms implementing the default strategy, one platform implementing the customizing strategy while the other implementing the default strategy, and both platforms implementing the customizing strategy, may be the final Nash equilibrium for platforms providing cross-market services, depending on the cross-side network externalities of platforms and the proportion of consumers who like and dislike the cross-market service. (3) Two situations, which are only one or both platforms implementing the default strategy, have the chance to bring the highest social welfare, while the situation in which both platforms implementing customizing strategy results in the lowest social welfare.

Key words: two-sided markets, platforms multimarket competition, cross-market service preference, privacy protection, platform regulation

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