奖励型众筹质量披露策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1920

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在奖励型众筹中，众筹项目的产品质量为创业者的私有信息。创业者对产品质量信息的披露将通过影响投资人的效用，进而影响投资人的投资决策。因此，本文分别针对采取AON机制和KIA机制的奖励型众筹项目构建模型，以创业者利润最大化为优化目标，利用博弈论和最优化方法，结合数值算例讨论分析了创业者的质量信息披露策略和价格决策，并探讨了AON机制和KIA机制下质量披露策略和利润的差异，分析了创业者对众筹机制的选择。研究结果表明，质量披露策略的选择与外部参数如产品单位成本、披露成本的大小有关，两种机制下的众筹都表现出在披露成本较小时具有披露或不披露质量信息的可能性，而当披露成本较大时，创业者将始终不会选择披露质量信息。对比创业者的利润，可以发现，没有哪一种机制在任何情况下总比另一种机制更优。

关键词: 奖励型众筹, 质量披露, AON机制, KIA机制

Abstract:

As a new online financing method， crowdfunding provides a new scheme for SMEs to raise funds. One of the branches of crowdfunding， namely reward-based crowdfunding， can not only serve as a channel for entrepreneurs to raise funds， but also predict the future demand of products. According to the practices and academic research on reward-based crowdfunding， how to attract more investors， improve the success rate of crowdfunding projects and get more profits are the issues that entrepreneurs need to focus on. Among these issues， the product quality is the most important factor that will determine the result of crowdfunding projects. In practice， entrepreneurs have different ways to illustrate the product quality， such as presenting a video on the website or show more figures about the product. However， now there is no research on the quality disclosure strategies for entrepreneurs in reward-based crowdfunding while considering the pricing decisions under different crowdfunding mechanisms. To answer the question， the quality disclosure and pricing decisions of the entrepreneur under the reward-based crowdfunding are investigated based on the All-Or-Nothing （AON） mechanism and Keep-It-All （KIA） mechanism， respectively. By establishing an analytical model with one entrepreneur and two potential investors， the optimal decisions of the entrepreneur are presented. Further， numerical experiments are conducted to investigate the influence of important parameters， while the results under the two mechanisms are compared. The conclusions of this paper are as follows： When the disclosure cost is low， the entrepreneur has two options to disclose quality information or not to disclose the quality information； while when the disclosure cost is high， the entrepreneur will certainly not disclose the quality information. In addition， if the unit cost of the product is high， the entrepreneur will choose to disclose the quality information. When the cost of the product and the cost of disclosure are relatively large， the entrepreneur will not create crowdfunding projects. In terms of entrepreneur’s profits， the increase of real product quality and valuation discount coefficient will not make entrepreneur’s profits worse. When the valuation discount coefficient or the real quality of the product is low， the entrepreneur can obtain higher profits under the AON mechanism. On the contrary， for the entrepreneur of crowdfunding campaigns with high real product quality and high valuation discount coefficient， he should choose the KIA mechanism. The conclusions of this paper will provide advice for entrepreneurs to choose the better crowdfunding mechanism and help them decide whether to disclose the product quality， which can improve the success rate of crowdfunding project and increase the expected profits from crowdfunding.

Key words: reward-based crowdfunding, quality disclosure, AON mechanism, KIA mechanism

中图分类号:

F272

张秋丹, 关磊, 阚兴金. 奖励型众筹质量披露策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2024, 32(12): 97-107.

Qiudan Zhang, Lei Guan, Xingjin Kan. Research on Quality Disclosure Strategies of Reward-based Crowdfunding[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(12): 97-107.

图/表 9

图1

表1

符号说明"

符号	符号说明
$p$	每个投资人的投资额
$q$	众筹项目产品的真实质量
$c$	生产产品所需的单位成本
$k$	创业者披露质量信息的成本
$θ i$	投资人的类型， $i ∈ 1,2$
$v i$	投资人对项目产品的估值， $i ∈ 1,2$
$q ˜$	投资人对产品质量的后验信息， $q ˜ ∈ q, q ¯$
$q ¯$	当创业者不披露质量信息时，投资人对产品质量的后验信息
$q ̂ #$	创业者决定是否披露质量信息的质量临界值
$σ$	投资人对产品估值的折现系数

表1

图2

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图5

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图7

图8

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