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论文

两阶段软件发布管理中的最优质量与定价——顾客需求不确定条件下的分析

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  • 1. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
    2. 中国邮政集团公司培训中心, 河北 石家庄 050021
李伟(1984-),男(汉族),河北秦皇岛人,天津大学2011级系统工程专业博士研究生,中国邮政集团公司培训中心教师,研究方向:信息产品的设计与定价、口碑营销、电子商务.

收稿日期: 2013-01-12

  修回日期: 2013-09-15

  网络出版日期: 2015-02-28

基金资助

国家自然科学基金杰出青年基金(70925005)

Optimal Quality and Pricein Two-Period Management of Software Release——Analysis under Uncertainty of Customers' Requirements

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  • 1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;
    2. Training Center of China Post Group Corporation, Shijiazhuang 050021, China

Received date: 2013-01-12

  Revised date: 2013-09-15

  Online published: 2015-02-28

摘要

软件厂商广泛采用多阶段产品发布策略应对不确定的顾客需求。为了研究需求不确定性对厂商决策的影响,构建了一个两阶段框架:垄断厂商在第一阶段向异质顾客推出质量较低的产品,通过产品的使用,将不确定的顾客需求变得更为明确,然后在第二阶段推出升级产品满足这些需求。将厂商的决策定义为受需求不确定性影响的最优化模型,将第一阶段的质量与两个阶段的定价作为决策变量,分析厂商在需求不确定条件下的最优决策。数值实验表明,需求不确定性越大,第一阶段的质量和两个阶段的定价越低。当需求不确定性非常大,且负口碑效应强度超过正口碑效应强度时,厂商在第一阶段就不应该推出软件产品。本文为信息商品领域内的厂商在不能准确把握顾客需求时的决策提供支持。

本文引用格式

李伟, 李敏强, 陈富赞 . 两阶段软件发布管理中的最优质量与定价——顾客需求不确定条件下的分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2015 , 23(2) : 108 -115 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.02.013

Abstract

Multi-period release is a widely adopted practice followed by software providers to cope with the uncertain customers' requirements. In order to examine the impact of the requirement uncertainty on software providers' decisions, a two-period framework is considered with a monopoly software firm releasing software products to heterogeneous customers. The monopolist releases the initial product with lower quality in the first period, making the uncertain requirements more specific through the interaction between the customers and the initial product. In the second period, the monopolist releases the upgrading product to meet those requirements. The monopolist's decisions as an optimization model impacted by requirements uncertainty are formulated, taking the quality of initial product and the prices of initial and upgrading product as decision variables. The numerical results illustrate that, both the optimal quality of the initial product and the optimal prices of the initial and upgrading products decrease in the requirements uncertainty. In addition, it is optimal for the monopolist not to release the initial product in the first period when the market satisfies following conditions simultaneously: Firstly, the uncertainty of customers' requirements is sufficiently high, and secondly, the intensity of the negative word-of-mouth effect is higher than that of positive word-of-mouth effect. Some supports are offered in our work to the optimal decisions in the context when the information goods providers can not capture correct requirements of the customers.

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