考虑双重信贷市场的融资可得性及正规化成本与优势,小微企业该如何进行正规化与非正规化选择,是摆在理论界与实务界面前重要的决策问题。文章以道德风险框架下的连续投资模型为基础,从企业融资角度出发,构建了基于企业初始资产的小微企业正规化与非正规化选择模型。通过引入正规化成本与双重信贷市场的不同信贷机制,比较分析了不同初始资产水平下,小微企业选择正规化与非正规化的效用。研究结果表明:存在一个初始资产阀值,在阀值之上,小微企业应该选择正规化;在阀值之下则应该选择非正规化。此外,通过进一步拓展模型,探讨了正规金融部门的组织质量、企业提供抵押的可能性和新型金融机构为小微企业提供金融服务对该选择的影响。
Considering the availabilities of financing of the dual credit markets and the costs and superiorities of formality, how to choose between formality and informality for small and micro businesses is a very important decision problem placed in front of both theory and practice fields. Based on the continuous investment model in a moral hazard framework, a choice model of small and micro businesses' formality and informality on their initial assets is built through the financing perspective. By introducing formality costs and different credit mechanisms of the two credit markets, the model analyzes the relative efficiency of the small and micro businesses' formality and informality under different levels of initial asset. The results show that, there exists an initial asset threshold, above which choosing formality is beneficial and under which choosing informality is beneficial. Then the model is further extended and the impact of the enforcement quality of the formal financial sector, the possibility of providing collateral by the small and micro businesses and the new type financial institutions providing small and micro businesses with financial services on the choice is discussed.
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