供应商是再制造战略研究中不可忽视的决策主体之一,因为制造商的产品回收再制造战略会对供应商的零部件供应决策产生影响,而且处于强势背景的供应商也有选择是否参与零部件的回收再制造的权利。为了探讨产品和零部件的两级再制造战略对供应商和零售商的定价决策及收益的影响,本文运用Stackelberg博弈,对供应商强势背景下供应商选择参与和选择不参与零部件的回收再制造的两种Supplier-Manufacturer闭环供应链模型进行了研究,并对两种情形下的定价决策与收益进行了对比分析。最后得出以下结论:再制造战略对批发价决策的影响与产品的市场需求状况有关,对零售价决策的影响与回收风险状况有关;供应商应积极参与两级再制造战略,因为供应商选择供应可再制造的零部件使自身受益,并且参与零部件的回收再制造可以在降低批发价和零售价的基础上使双方受益。最后,运用数值算例验证了本文的研究结论,丰富了再制造战略对定价决策及收益影响的研究成果。
Suppliers are decision-makers which can't be ignored in the studies of remanufacturing, because the suppliers' decision would be influenced by the manufacturers' product remanufacturing strategy, and the suppliers have a choice whether to participate the parts remanufacturing or not under supplier-dominated. In order to discuss the influence of two-echelon remanufacturing (product remanufacturing and parts remanufacturing) on the members' pricing decision and revenues, Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze two models according to whether the supplier is involved in the parts remanufacturing or not, then a comparative analysis on the pricing decisions and revenues is made. Finally, the following conclusions are drawn from this paper: with the implementation of remanufacturing strategy, the pricing decision of wholesale price relate to the demand situation, and the pricing decision of retail price relate to the recycling risk situation; The supplier should take an active part in the two-echelon remanufacturing strategy, because it is beneficial for the supplier to provide parts that can be used to remanufacture, and it will not only increase the both members' revenues but also reduce the both wholesale price and retail price if the supplier takes part in the activity of parts remanufacturing. Finally, the conclusions are demonstrated by a numerical example. The research results about the impacts of remanufacturing strategies on pricing decisions and revenues are enriched.
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