汽车行业是我国能源消耗和污染物排放"大户",是节能减排工作的重点。政府出台了针对性的汽车消费政策以鼓励和引导汽车消费者购买行为。本文根据我国汽车消费市场消费者对不同排量汽车购买行为及政府消费政策之间的博弈情况,构建消费者和政府的演化博弈模型,分析混合均匀情形下的消费者群体考虑单一汽车品牌情况下选取不同排量汽车行为的演化问题,研究表明:在油价、消费效用、消费政策及购车成本的共同作用下,消费者购买行为存在向小排量演化、随机演化和向大排量演化三种具体情况。以大众迈腾汽车为案例分析了目前消费者购买行为的演化特征,当汽油价格较低所带来的运营变动成本不足以成为阻碍汽车消费者购买大排量汽车行为因素,或者消费效用之差较高的情况下,政府要加大实施消费政策力度以引导消费者购买小排量汽车;当汽油价格位于较高水平下,政府可以逐步放松实施与汽车排量相关的消费政策。为政府科学合理引导汽车消费者节能购车行为提供理论借鉴。
The automotive industry is an important source of China's energy consumption and pollutant emissions, and is the focus of the work of energy saving and emission reduction, and the government adjusted auto consumption policy to encourage and guide automotive consumer s' buying behavior. In this context, according to the game between the situations in China's auto consumption market consumer buying behavior of different cars and government consumption policies, an evolutionary game model of consumer purchase behavior for different displacement cars is constructed, and the evolution problem of the evenly mixed consumer group's different displacement automobile behavior is analyzed in the case of single automobile brand. Studies have shown that: in the combined effect of oil prices, consumer utility, consumer policy and car costs, consumer buying behavior exists to the three specific evolution cases of the evolution to the small displacement evolution, random evolution and the evolution to the large displacement. Then the evolution characteristics of consumer buying behavior are analyzed in the particular case of the Volkswagen Magotan car in the current circumstances. When the operational costs for lower oil price is not enough to become an obstacle to the car consumers to buy cars behavior capacity factors, or the utility consumption difference is higher, the government should increase the intensity of consumption policies to guide consumers to purchase low-emission cars; when the oil price is on the higher level, the government can gradually relax implementation auto consumption policy. The theoretical support is provided for the government to guide automotive consumers' scientific and reasonable energy-saving buying behavior.
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