针对生鲜农产品实体损耗一直困扰着农产品经营这一难题,研究由一个零售商和一个供应商组成的农产品订货问题。在零售商一次提前订购基础上,分别建立供应商一次供货和二次供货模型。经比较得到,二次供货下的最优订购量要大于一次供货下的最优订购量;零售商、供应商在二次供货下的最大期望利润要大于一次供货下的最大期望利润。最后,通过实例分析发现:二次供货下零售商和供应商一起承担了生鲜农产品损耗给供应链带来的风险;季中批发价的合理设定,可以使二次供货下的供应链对生鲜农产品损耗的抵御力更强。研究结论对我国进一步深入"农超对接"具有一定的指导意义。
In this paper, supply chain consisting of one retailer and one supplier is focused on, investigating its order decisions in the presence of the intractable problem of entities wastage of fresh agricultural product. Once delivering and twice delivering model is constructed respectively on the basis of the retailer's once ordering in advance, and it's found that the optimal ordering quantity is greater with twice delivering than that with once delivering. Moreover, compared with once delivering, maximum profits of both members are greater under twice delivering. Case analysis is applied to demonstrate that both the retailer and the supplier share the channel risk due to the wastage of fresh agricultural product, and that setting appropriate wholesale price in the selling season proves to have a positive effect in enhancing the ability against loss risks. Our conclusions provide vital significance in depth practice of agriculture-supermarket jointing.
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