本文以2004-2012年提供开放式基金的基金公司为研究对象,以基金公司市场份额为切入点,利用动态面板模型,检验了基金公司历史业绩、产品创新策略和机制创新策略在基金公司竞争中的有效性。实证结果显示历史业绩是影响基金公司市场竞争力的重要因素,基金投资者偏好具有产品创新能力和机制创新精神的基金公司,并不热衷于投资成立时间久、旗下基金数量众多的老牌金公司,对基金公司股东背景也没有显著偏好。进一步细分市场发现,在股票型基金市场上,实施创造明星策略有利于获得更高市场份额。在债券型基金市场上,提高新基金供给量和相对供给强度是最优策略。与股票型基金市场相同,在混合型基金市场上提供具有实质性创新特征的新基金、增加基金从业者持基的基金数量,有助于获得更大市场份额。因此,基金公司决策层在制定竞争战略时,应当考虑基金投资者对产品创新认知能力的提高和对利益绑定机制的诉求,依据基金类型的不同,设计具有针对性的竞争策略。
In this paper, the effectiveness of product innovation strategy and mechanism innovation strategy in fund company competition during 2004-2012 are examined. Taking market share as entry point with a dynamic panel data model estimated by system general moment method (system GMM), the empirical result shows that historical performance is an important factor that affects the market competition results. Meanwhile investors prefer the fund company with superior product innovation ability and enterprising spirit of mechanism innovation, rather than fund companies with a long history and many funds under management. The fund company ownership is irrelevant. Segmenting the fund market by investment targets, it's demonstrated that in the stock fund market, star strategy is particularly important, while in the bond fund market, the increasing supply of new funds and relative supply intensity is the optimal strategy. The same as in the stock fund company, to gain more market share fund company should provide new funds with substantial innovation characteristics and increase the number of funds that fund practitioners hold. Therefore, decision-makers of fund company should take fund investors' improved cognitive ability of product innovation and the need to bind the interests of related agents into consideration, and formulate the competition strategy according to different types of fund.
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