针对混合渠道销售及回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链(CLSC),考虑当前我国实施的WEEE规制政策的影响,建立CLSC决策模型,并基于博弈分析方法求得政府规制工具的最优参数和CLSC中各成员企业的最优经营策略及利润,以及社会福利和消费者剩余。结果表明:政府向电器电子产品制造商征收的WEEE处理基金越高,则产品批发价、直销价和分销价均越高;政府给予WEEE处理商的处理补贴越高,则各WEEE回收企业的回收价格及回收量均越高;消费者环保意识越高以及对WEEE回收价越敏感,都越有助于各回收企业增加WEEE回收量,提高CLSC各成员企业的利润,以及促进社会福利和消费者剩余的增加;消费者对产品分销价与直销价的价格差越敏感,则对制造商和销售商的利润、社会福利以及消费者剩余越无益,但不影响第三方回收企业和处理企业的利润。
To investigate the impact of competition among collection channels and sale channels on the decision-makings of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) members and the optimal government regulations for this CLSC, decision models for electrical and electronic equipment CLSC with hybrid sale/collection channels under government regulations were developed. Based on game analysis method, the optimal parameters for government regulation, optimal decisions and profits of CLSC members, social welfare and consumer surplus were obtained. The results show that the higher the fee levied for WEEE disposal, the higher the wholesale price, the direct selling price and distribution price; the higher the subsidy for WEEE recycling, the higher the collection price and collection amount of WEEE. With the increase of consumer environmental consciousness and sensitivity to WEEE collection price, the collection amount of WEEE, the profits of CLSC members, social welfare and consumer surplus will increase. A numerical example in computer industry was taken to investigate the impact of customer sensitivity on the gap between direct selling price and distribution price. It is found that an increase in customer sensitivity would decrease the profits of manufacturer and retailer, social welfare and customer surplus, but it has no influence on the profits of third-party collector and recycler. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: first, decision models are devoloped for CLSC with hybrid sale/collection channels and the optimal government regulations are deduced for this CLSC, as well as the influence of government regulations on the decisions of CLSC members; second, a new way is provided to calculate customer surplus under hybrid sale/collection channels based on the classical definition of customer surplus.
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