研究了双渠道销售商的退款保证策略选择问题。将销售商的退款保证策略分为两个渠道都不提供、仅实体渠道提供、仅网络渠道提供以及两个渠道同时提供等四种。分别求解得到相应的最优定价及利润。研究发现:销售商在实体渠道和网络渠道的产品价格仅与其是否在该渠道提供退款保证服务有关,而与另一渠道是否提供退款保证无关。如果销售商想要刺激某渠道的利润水平,当退货产品残值较高时应选择在该渠道提供退款保证,而当残值较低时应选择在另一渠道提供退款保证。通过数值分析发现,同时在两个渠道提供退款保证并非总是销售商的最优策略。销售商的退款保证策略选择与两个渠道间的成本差异有关,当两个渠道间的成本差异较高时,销售商最好仅在网络渠道提供退款保证。
The strategy choice of Money-back guarantees of a dual channel retailer is studied. There are four kinds of MBG policies for the retailer, i.e., no MBG, MBG only in traditional channel, MBG only in direct channel, as well as MBG in both traditional and direct channels. The optimal pricing strategy as well as the optimal profit of the retailer in different MBG scenarios are derived. By the comparison analysis, it's found that the product price in the two channels only depends on the MBG state in the channel, while it has nothing to do with the MBG state in the other channel. If the retailer wants to incur the profit level in one channel, it should provide MBG in the channel when the salvage value of the return product is high and provide MBG in the other channel when the salvage value is low. By the numerical analysis, it's found that the policy which provides MBG in both channels is not always the optimal choice for the retailer. When the cost difference between the two channels is small comparatively, it is beneficial for the retailer to provide MBG in both of the channels. However, when the cost difference is moderate, the choice depends on the salvage value of product. Once the cost difference between the two channels is very large, it is always favorable for the retailer to provide MBG only in the direct channel.
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