针对子公司角色变化引起的行为变化,将子公司行为细分为探索行为和开发行为,利用委托代理理论进行报酬契约设计,探究企业集团相关决策变量对子公司二元行为努力的影响机理。研究结果表明:总部最优产出分享系数和子公司开发行为努力程度随总部支持的提高而降低、随开发行为盈利水平的降低而降低、随探索行为预期收益率和子公司可投入水平的提高呈"正U"型趋势;探索行为努力程度在探索行为预期收益率和子公司可投入水平较低时随总部支持的提高呈"倒U"型趋势,反之呈线性增长趋势;另外,探索行为努力程度随开发行为盈利水平、探索行为预期收益率和子公司可投入水平的提高而提高。最后,本文利用数值算例对上述结论进行了直观演示。
For the changes of subsidiary behaviors caused by role changes, subsidiary behaviors are firstly divided into exploratory behavior and exploitative behavior. In order to explore the influence of relevant decision variables on dualistic behaviors of subsidiary, the principal-agent theory is used to design a compensation contract model. The results show that: the optimal output sharing coefficient and the exploitative effort level will decrease with the raise of headquarters support level and the reduction of exploitative profitability, and they shows the tendency of "positive U shape" with the raise of subsidiary input and expected rate of exploratory return. If the subsidiary input or the expected rate of exploratory return is very low, the exploratory effort level shows the tendency of "inverted U shape" with the raise of headquarters support level. Otherwise, it shows the tendency of increase. Besides, the exploratory effort level will improve with the raise of exploitative profitability, expected rate of exploratory return and subsidiary input. Finally, this paper gives a visual display of the conclusions by a numerical example. Some theoretical references are provided for headquarters to control subsidiary dualistic behaviors effectively by the optimal incentive mechanism and resource support, and a new direction is provided for the study of subsidiary dualistic behaviors by deductive method.
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