研究了非对称信息下供应链在突发事件下的应急管理和信息价值问题。当供应链生产计划已经完成后,突发事件发生并导致零售商所面临的市场需求规模以及供应商的生产成本同时发生突变,而且这些突变信息对于供应链成员而言是非对称的。分析了非对称信息对应急管理的影响以及相应的管理对策,发现非对称信息下的最优生产量不超过对称信息下的最优生产量,导致供应链系统收益减少并产生了信息价值,分析了非对称信息下供应链系统的信息价值规律以及影响因素。最后给出数值算例说明了信息在供应链中的重要价值,同时也说明了突发事件情况下实施应急管理的必要性和重要性。

With the development of economy and technology, information is becoming more and more important in the market competition, and asymmetric information is quiet common in daily life and society production, the same is true for supply chain. On the other hand, emergency events such as natural disaster, public health emergency event etc, occur frequently in recent years, which affect the normal production arrangement of enterprises and supply chains. Supply chain disruption management attracts more attention. While the existing models always assume that supply chain partners have symmetric information so that supply chains can react to disruption risk in a coordinated way. However, the disruption information is more likely to be asymmetric between supply chain members in practice. In this paper, supply chain disruption management and information value under asymmetric information is studied. Supply chain is composed of a supplier and a retailer, and the demand is nonlinear. Demand and cost are disrupted simultaneously after the production plan, and the disruption information is asymmetric for the supply chain members, that is to say, retailer can obtain precise demand disruption information(ΔD)but supplier just know (ΔD)∈{ΔD,ΔD};and supplier can obtain precise cost information(Δc)but retailer just know(Δc)∈{Δc,Δc}. How to coordinate the supply chain to response to the disruption is discussed and a supply chain coordination model is set up based on the principal-agent model. Supply chain disruption is analyzed with supplier as the principal and retailer as the principal under asymmetric information respectively. In the model, the agent has full information about disruption and the principal does not know exactly the disruption information, the principal has monopoly power over the agent. The contracts are designed by the principal and offered to the agent as a take-it or leave-it offer. The agent accepts the contracts if and only if his expected profit is satisfied. The supply chain profit function is solved with classification method. The results show that, under asymmetric disruption information, supply chain can keep the original production plan in some cases, and the production quantity under asymmetric information equals to that under symmetric information when the demand scale varies more or the cost varies less, but the information owners can earn more profit. While the production quantity under asymmetric information is not larger than that under symmetric information when the demand scale varies less or the cost varies more and the profit of supply chain decreases with production quantity decreases. The difference of profit under symmetric and asymmetric information is analyzed as information value. The information value is not monotonic and is affect seriously by the degree of principal's mastering the disruption information. Finally the model is verified by numerical examples. And it is found find that information value with supplier as principal fluctuates more seriously than that with retailer as principal,that is to say, asymmetric demand information has a greater influence than cost on the profit and the decision of the supply chain. In brief, a frame is offered for dealing with supply chain disruption management under asymmetric information to other related studies. Furthermore, it can be used as reference to some related research about how to deal with supply chain disruption management under asymmetric information if the risk attitude of supply chain's member is considered.