生鲜农产品供应链上下游存在新鲜度信息的不对称性，加剧了耗损。为此，迫切需要研究生产商隐瞒新鲜度信息的生鲜农产品供应链协调。基于Stackelberg博弈，使用单周期报童模型分别构建生产商和零售商的利润函数，分析供应链性质；并提出具体的回购契约形式进行供应链协调。研究认为：一般的批发价格契约下，即使生产商隐瞒农产品新鲜度信息，也不一定损害供应链总收益；回购契约可以保证新鲜度信息共享并协调供应链。最后，通过数值算例验证分析结论的有效性。
Serious damages and spoils of fresh agricultural supply chain result from the high complicated management by fresh agricultural products' short life, perishable and seasonal characteristics, which lead to coordination difficulties between upstream and downstream. Specially, the information asymmetry existing widely, such as producer conceals the private freshness information to retailer, will further aggravate this circulative loss. Thus, it is a need for us to research on the coordination of fresh agricultural supply chain with asymmetric freshness information.
In this paper, a one-producer-one-retailer fresh agricultural supply chain in which the producer holds private freshness information is considered. The producer has to determine the wholesale price based on the production cost, the output and the retailer's possible order quantity. The retailer, on the other hand, has to determine order quantity and selling price, by taking into account the market demand and the freshness information came from producer. Models are developed to study the coordination mechanism of this supply chain with asymmetric freshness information. Moreover, a buyback contract is proposed to facilitate coordination between the two parties.
It is considered that agricultural products' demand is random, sensitive to the freshness, which degrades accelerated over time. Some single cycle newsboy models are developed, and each party's optimal decisions are derived in both decentralized and centralized systems based on Stackelberg game.
Two scenarios are analyzed in this model: freshness information symmetry and asymmetry. Firstly, the coordination model under symmetrical freshness information is constructed. Secondly, the centralized system and the decentralized system decision mechanism are analyzed under the scene that producer conceals the freshness information. Finally, the specific form of buyback contract is investigated to coordinate the supply chain.
An important implication from our study is that even if the producer conceals the freshness of the agricultural products, it will not necessarily impair the overall profit of the supply chain under the wholesale-price contract. In addition, we can ensure information sharing and supply chain coordination through appropriate buyback contract.
In the end, an illustrative case study dealing with acelery cabbage supply chain is discussed. Also, the impact of different freshness, conceal coefficient and profit distribution coefficient under asymmetric freshness information is illustrated.
Our contribution lies in how to find appropriate contract to coordinate this fresh agricultural supply chain when asymmetric information exists in the supply chain in which producer conceals the private freshness information to retailer.
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