针对废旧电子产品市场中由再制造商、回收商和消费者构成的闭环供应链，研究了再制造商处理回收商回收能力隐匿的逆向选择问题和努力水平隐匿的道德风险问题。运用激励理论研究在双重信息不对称下，再制造商如何设计激励机制引导回收商努力回收废旧电子产品的问题。根据委托代理理论，运用信息甄别原理，考虑回收商回收的所有产品中只有部分产品满足于再制造的条件，构建了委托代理框架下闭环供应链的激励机制模型，并对模型进行求解、分析，讨论了各相关因素对努力程度的影响，并通过数值仿真进一步验证了相关因素对甄别契约参数和双方期望利润的影响。研究结果表明：低能力回收商获得的再制造产品数量的提成系数向下扭曲，只有如实汇报能力类型才能获得保留利润；高回收能力的回收商既获得保留利润，又获得额外的信息租金；再制造商签约高能力者获得的利润高于签约低能力者，随着市场中高能力者比例的增加，签约高能力者使得再制造商获得更多利润。
Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain constituted by the remanufacturer, the collector and consumers in the market of waste electronic products, this paper researches that how the remanufacturer handles the adverse selection problem with the collector's collecting ability hidden and deals with the moral hazard problem with his effort level hidden. Though using incentive theory, how does the remanufacturer design the incentive mechanism, guiding the collector to collect the waste electronic products under the dual information asymmetry, is studied in this paper. The fact is that only a part of products collected can be used to remanufactured, so the incentive mechanism model of closed-loop supply chain under agent framework is constructed, according to the principal-agent theory, by using the principle of information screening. In addition, the model is solved, and the influence of the related factors on the degree of effort is discussed. Besides, through numerical simulation, we further validate the effect of related factors on screening contract parameters and the expected profit. The results showed that royalty coefficient of the number of remanufactured products, which low collecting ability collector gains, is downward distortion. To get retained profits, he has to report true type of collecting ability. The collector, with high collecting capacity, not only can get retained profits, but also can have additional information rent. The remanufacturer, signing high ability collector, can obtain more profit than that, signing the low ability collector. With the increase of the proportion of high capacity in the market, the manufacturer can obtain more profits by signing high ability collector.
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