考虑到供应链实际构成与四级供应链质量控制研究不足，本文运用stackblerg博弈分析模型，研究了由供应商、制造商、经销商与消费者组成的四级供应链产品质量控制问题。在考虑需求不确定性的基础上，分析制造商与经销商之间延期支付和货款首付比例两种策略对供应链产品质量控制水平的影响，通过运用最优化原理求解制造商和供应商的最优质量控制水平并对结果进行仿真模拟，结果显示：制造商与经销商之间非质量协调策略对供应链产品质量有间接协调作用；制造商提高经销商货款首付比例或缩短余款延期支付时间，不仅有助于提高自身产品加工质量控制水平，更有助于供应商原材料质量水平提高，制造商在运用两种策略时，必须同时考虑产品价格引致的消费者需求量的变化和质量控制对其他主体收益变化的影响。
Considering the structure of supply chain in practice and Shortcomings of quality control study in four-levels of supply chain present. In this paper, the product quality control problem in four-levels of the supply chain, which consist of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors and customers is studized based on the stackblerg game mode. Considering the uncertainty of customer demand,the variation of the product quality level and supply chain's profit with coordination of initial payment proportion and delay in payment between the manufacturers and distributors are analyzed. Also the optimal quality control levels of the manufacturers and suppliers are solved using the principle of optimization, after the simulation, the result shows:The quality levels of the supplier and supply chain will be affected by the coordination strategies between nonproductive parts indirectly. Whether increase the initial payment proportion or shorten the time of delay in payment, the quality levels of the manufacturer and supplier will be coordinated, especially, the quality level of raw material. However, both of the benefit variations of other subjects caused by quality control and the influence of the consumer demand because of the product market price changes must be considered, when the two strategies are used.
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