作为一种供应链融资模式，保兑仓是解决中小企业融资难问题的重要方案，其借助核心企业的信用，提升了中小企业的信用状况，使得中小企业更容易获得银行的资金支持。然而，随着市场状况的恶化，很多中小企业倒闭，核心企业承担大额银行贷款的连带赔偿责任。本文研究由单一的零售商（中小企业）和制造商（核心企业）组成的供应链中，考虑零售商的破产概率，由银行控制货权，供应商对剩余产品进行一定比例的回购，零售商以银行提供的承兑汇票作为结算工具进行融资的情况下，分析了零售商的最优订货量、供应商的最优回购率和银行的最优贷款利率的决策。并通过算例得出回购率的提高能鼓励零售商订货，提高供应链的利润。但是，回购率对银行利润的变动很大程度上受零售商破产概率影响。较高的回购率刺激信用良好的零售商提高订货量会增加银行的利润，对信用较差的零售商来说，订货量的提高会使银行遭受损失的可能性提高，期望利润反而降低。所以，银行在提供保兑仓融资时，不仅要关注中小企业和核心企业的信贷偿还能力，还要加强贷款资金的监管，关注保兑仓融资的风险。
Using core enterprise's credit for reference and confirming warehouse emerge as the times require to strengthen SMEs' credit condition make it easier for them to get financial support from banks. However, with the deterioration of market conditions, many SMEs go bankrupt and the core enterprise then undertake huge joint indemnity. In the supply chain, a bi-level Stackelberg game in which the bank acts as the leader, the manufacturer as the subleader, the retailor as the follower is formulated. Taking the retailer's bankruptcy probability into account, the manufacturer buys back a certain percentage of unsold products and retailer takes the acceptance draft as a settlement tool to finance products. By adopting backward induction method, the decision of the retailer's optimal order quantity, manufacturer's optimal buyback rate and the bank's optimal interest rate is analyzed. Through numerical examples, it is found that the increase of the buyback rate can encourage the retailer to order and improve the profit of the supply chain. However, the change of the buyback rate to the bank's profit is greatly influenced by the retailer's bankruptcy probability. Higher buyback rate can stimulate creditworthy retailer to order more, and thus increase the bank's profit. To the poor credit retailer, the increase of order quantity will make bank a greater probability to suffer from loss, with expected profit reducing at the same time. So, when adopting any form of buyback contract, special attention should be paid to the side effect of bringing manufacturer to assume partial risk of market fluctuation. When demand recession resulting in SMEs' failure to repay bank acceptance bills, core enterprise can not make a full compensation either. Before signing for confirming warehouse agreement, bank should focus on both SMEs and core enterprise's credit repayment ability, as well as strengthen fund supervision, to avoid misusing of credit. With more and more people are concerned about the supply chain finance, the risk it brings to the entire supply chain system should not be neglected.
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