目前，我国大部分废旧电器电子产品流入了不具备拆解资质的非正规回收渠道，给具备拆解资质的正规渠道带来较大竞争。鉴于此，本文研究政府补贴和市场合作对正规渠道的扶持作用。一方面正规渠道可以获得回收处理基金提供的拆解补贴。另一方面，基于两种渠道不同的回收处理方式，本文引入正规渠道与再制造商合作的市场机制，即正规渠道可以转让较高质量的旧品给再制造商进行加工再制造。本文首先研究正规和非正规渠道之间的回收竞争，建立依据质量进行回收定价的博弈模型。根据两种渠道不同的处理方式划分三种竞争情景，分别求解均衡解，研究在不同质量段上两种渠道的回收定价和再制造商在旧品转让中的定价决策。随着补贴水平和再制造品价格的提高，探讨补贴机制对回收竞争的影响，分析市场合作机制对于提高正规渠道竞争能力的作用。结果发现补贴可以有效提高正规渠道的竞争力，当政府补贴不是很高时，市场合作机制可以对正规渠道发挥重要的支撑作用。
At present, most of China's waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) flows into the informal recycling channel without disassembling qualification, which exerts a big competitive effect on the formal channel with disassembling qualification. Faced with the serious e-waste problem, how to support formal channel and promote the regulated WEEE recycling has become a major concern for China. In the current literature, there is a lack of research on the impact of subsidy and market cooperation on the formal channel, based on the recycling competition between formal and informal channels. This paper aims to study the role of government subsidy and market cooperation in supporting the formal channel. On the one hand, the formal channel can be provided dismantling subsidy by the China Recycling Fund. On the other hand, the different disposal methods are examined between the two channels and the market mechanism in which the formal channel cooperates with a remanufactureris introduced. As such the formal channel can sell the high-quality old products to the remanufacturer for remanufacturing. The recycling competition between formal and informal channels is firstly studied, and a game model with quality-based acquisition pricing is established. Based on the different disposal methods between two channels, three competition scenarios are set and the equilibrium solutions are solved respectively. The acquisition pricing of the two channels in different quality levels of old products and the pricing decision of the remanufacturer in the transfer of old products are examined. The influence of subsidy on recycling competition is discussed, and the role of market cooperation in improving the competitiveness of formal channel is analyzed. Furthermore, the changes of acquisition prices are a numerically simulated at different quality levels of old products in three scenarios. Based on the recycling practices in China, the recycling industry corresponding to each scenario of the model is analyzed. The results show that fund subsidy can effectively improve the competitiveness of the formal channel. When the subsidy is not very high, market cooperation can play an important supporting role to the formal channel. The demarcation point in the roles of fund subsidy and market cooperation depends on the relative value of subsidy level and the transfer price of old products for remanufacturing. When remanufactured products are more popular in the market, the transfer price provided by the remanufacturer will be higher, which can help the formal channel enhance its competitiveness in the product acquisition. Our paper provides a modeling framework for the following research based on the competition between formal and informal channels and has practical significance in promoting the regulated development of recycling industry in China.
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