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论文

基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的大型客机主制造商-供应商协同合作策略研究

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  • 1. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院, 江苏 南京 211106;
    2. 金陵科技学院商学院, 江苏 南京 211169

收稿日期: 2016-06-30

  修回日期: 2017-01-17

  网络出版日期: 2017-08-26

基金资助

国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AZD049);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502073,71171112);研究生创新基金(kfjj20160906)

Analysis on the Main Manufacture-Supplier Cooperative Strategies of Airliner Based on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

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  • 1. Economics and Management College, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China;
    2. School of Business, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211169, China

Received date: 2016-06-30

  Revised date: 2017-01-17

  Online published: 2017-08-26

摘要

研究大型客机在"主制造商-供应商"模式下的协同合作均衡策略问题。本文针对我国大型客机主制造商发展时间较短,在部分子系统的核心技术能力处于"弱势"的特点,但通过与供应商协同合作能有效解决子系统的生产制造问题,所以供应商的合作态度会影响大型客机的生产质量与效率。考虑收益分配和订购量对供应商的激励作用,以及主制造商核心技术能力的信息不完全对供应商的诱导作用,提出了基于不完全信息的主制造商、供应商的协同合作博弈模型。研究了两方博弈过程中各方可能的均衡策略以及不同策略的形成条件。研究结果表明,收益分配系数和订购量会影响合作均衡策略,主制造商采用混同策略优于分离策略。本文从主制造商视角研究合作均衡策略,揭示了主制造商激励供应商积极合作的问题,为大型客机主制造商供应商的长期战略合作的策略制定提供解决依据。

本文引用格式

易凯凯, 朱建军, 张明, 王翯华 . 基于不完全信息动态博弈模型的大型客机主制造商-供应商协同合作策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017 , 25(5) : 125 -134 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.05.015

Abstract

The consideration of how hard for main manufacture with poor capability to control supplier with strong capability, and leading to the first flight of new aircraft delay. Discussing the collaborative equilibrium strategy of airline on the "main manufacturer-suppliers" model. Focusing on the characteristics of the main manufacture of aircraft with short developing time in China and poor core technical capability of subsystem, but cooperating with the supplier can mostly solve the problem of production, with the result that the supplier's attitude of cooperation will influence the quality and efficiency. In the consideration of the incentive effect of profit distribution and order quantity, and the induction to supplier of incomplete information in the main manufacture's core technical capability, using Cobb-Douglas production function to show the profit of supplier and main manufacture, which leads to the collaborative game model under incomplete information between the main manufacture and supplier.Discussing the equilibrium strategies and existence conditions, making the comparison of them and finding the strategy which makes higher profit. Results show that the profit distribution coefficient and order quantity will influence collaborative strategies, and and main manufacturer uses pooling strategy is strictly better than separating strategy. With the case analysis,we get the optimum strategy of small batch with high profit distribution coefficient and large batch with low coefficient. This paper reveals the suppliers' collaborative attitude motivation issue from the perspectives of main manufacture collaborative strategies, and it has an important guiding significance for the long-term strategic cooperation between the main manufacture and supplier of airliner.

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