在物流服务商外部收益信息对称与非对称的环境下，面向物流能力预定问题研究了零售商与物流服务商之间的契约协调机制。结果发现，包含物流服务价格与闲置能力补偿费用的补偿合约在两种信息环境下都能够协调双方企业的行为，使得零售商预定的物流能力数量达到集中决策下的系统最优值。物流服务商外部收益系数越大，零售商制定的闲置能力补偿费用应当越高；在信息非对称的环境下，如果物流服务商追求的是固定保留利润，物流服务商有隐瞒外部收益的动机，如果追求的是可变保留利润，物流服务商有夸大外部收益的动机；为了甄别物流服务商真实的外部收益信息，与信息对称环境下相比，零售商应当提高物流服务价格，降低闲置能力补偿费用。最后，基于算例分析了信息非对称程度和外部收益大小对补偿合约及双方企业期望利润的影响，并在信息非对称的环境下验证了补偿合约的有效性。

With the rise of inter-firm cooperation, capacity outsourcing appears not only in the manufacturing industry, but also in the service industry. In this paper, logistics service system in which a retailer (she) outsources the activity of order delivery to a logistics service provider (LSP, he) is considered. The retailer faces random demands and is allowed to make capacity reservation before order arriving. The LSP has fixed amount of logistics capacity and aside from the retailer, has another external cooperation opportunity. The LSP would get external revenue if he allocates logistics capacity to the external cooperator. We assume that the retailer doesn't always have the perfect information about the LSP's external revenue. In such case, how to design a coordination mechanism to assure the system-wide optimization by encouraging the LSP to tell the truth and the retailer to make the right decision on capacity reservation is highly needed.From the perspective of the retailer, a mechanism of compensation contracts, in which besides the service fee, the retailer gives the LSP a compensation fee for each left-over capacity due to over-reservation, is proposed. By using game theory and the apparatus of mechanism design, the retailer's optimal compensation contracts under the LSP's external revenue information being symmetric and asymmetric are solved. Then, these contracts are analyzed and they are compared between the two different information conditions.It is found that thecompensation contract mechanism works out perfectly. Both the logistics reservation quantity and the expected profit of the whole system in each of the information conditions reach the same values as in the centralized decision-making condition. In optimal contracts, the compensation fee should be increased with LSP's external revenue index; Under the information asymmetric condition, the LSP has the motivation to understate the external revenue if he pursues for unchangeable retained profit while he has the motivation to overstate the external revenue if he pursues for changeable retained profit; In order to induce the LSP to disclose his real external revenue information, the retailer should increase the service price and at the same decrease the compensation fee compared to the information symmetric condition. In the end, numerical examples are used to verify the compensation contracts as well as to analyze how external revenue and its degree of asymmetry affecting the contracts and the two parties' expected profits. Our work extends the research of logistics capacity coordination to consider asymmetric information. The results show that optimal logistics outsourcing contracts should incorporate the LSP's external revenue and the form of his retained profit into different information conditions.