政府监督者的执法监督行为是制约工程质量政府监督有效性的内在根源，工程质量政府监督运行的本质特征是双重委托代理机制。国内外多重委托代理研究多局限于同一对象、抽象化主体之间的行为策略与均衡过程，工程质量政府监督具有两层委托代理面向对象差异和第二层次代理人——监督小组的组织结构复杂性特征，探究其代理链多层次激励机制将有利于丰富双重委托代理理论。基于建设主体构成和经济契约特征分析，剖析建设工程质量政府监督的委托代理关系与特征，构建与简化工程质量政府监督代理链；采用Holmstrom与Milgrom参数化方法架构工程质量政府监督委托代理机制模型，基于代理链结构分析形成简化的激励机制模型，通过博弈求解得到工程质量监督的激励参数，并进行了算例演示分析。结果表明：激励系数β是r、σ²和b的减函数，工程质量形成过程的方差愈大（σ²越大），代理人愈是害怕努力工作，相应承担的风险就愈小；质量监督小组的努力程度a_ik=β/bΛ_ik²与β成正比，与其成本系数、工程合同额成反比，提高监督人员的素质和专业水平有利于降低其质量监督成本系数；激励机制运行的前提是建立质量分级评价机制；质量监督成本将会影响到其质量监督努力水平（a_ik=β/bΛ_ik²），质量监督成本与监督者能力成反比；若政府监督部门保留费用比例为1-ρ，调整激励机制的系数为ρδ和ργ，仍可使政府的目标函数达到最优；当不考虑项目合同额Λ_ik时，模型将简化为委托单代理模型，β=1/1+rbσ²。除激励机制外，实施惩罚机制、信誉机制、保险机制、评级机制共同作用有利于保障工程质量稳步提升。工程质量政府监督代理链与多层次激励机制研究将为工程质量政府监督协同激励对策制定与运行机制优化提供理论支撑，提供其他公共品监管激励理论借鉴。

The supervision behavior of government regulation is the inner source of project quality government supervision effectiveness, The essential characteristics of project quality government supervision running are double principal-agent mechanism. Multiple principal-agent research at home and abroad are limited to the same object, abstract subject behavior between strategy and balanced process, government supervision over the quality engineering has two layers of principal-agent differences and the second level agents, the complex organizational structure of the monitoring group, to explore its agent chain multi-level incentive mechanism will be conducive to double principal-agent theory.Based on the construction main body structure and the economic contract, Analysis the principal-agent relations and characteristics of construction project quality government supervision, building and simplifying the project quality government supervision agency chain; construct the principal-agent mechanism model of project quality government supervision with Holmstrom and Milgrom parameterization method, based on the analysis of agent chain structure to simplify the incentive mechanism model, through the game model to get the incentive parameters of project supervision. Results show that: Incentive coefficient β is r、σ² and b decreasing function, Project quality forming process of the larger the variance, the agent is more afraid of hard work, the corresponding risk is smaller. Quality supervision team effort a_ik=β/bΛ_ik² is proportional to the β, and is inversely proportional to the cost coefficient and engineering contracts, enhance the quality of supervision and professional level is helpful to reduce its quality supervision cost coefficient; set up quality grading evaluation mechanism is the precondition of incentive mechanism; quality supervision cost will affect its quality supervision effort level (a_ik=β/bΛ_ik²), quality supervision is inversely proportional to the cost and the ability of supervisors; if the government supervision department keep expense proportion is 1-ρ, adjusting incentive mechanism coefficients is ρδ and ργ, the government objective function can achieve the optimal. When take no account of the project contracts, it can simplified to unit principal-agent model, β=1/1+rbσ². In addition to the incentive mechanism, the work together of the punishment implementation mechanism, reputation mechanism, insurance mechanism and the rating system make for ensure the steady rise of engineering quality. Project quality government supervision agency chain and multi-level incentive mechanism research will be for engineering quality and government supervision coordination incentive measures and operation mechanism optimization to provide theoretical support and serve as a reference for other public goods regulatory incentive theory.