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论文

恐怖袭击事件中悲观/乐观情绪如何影响博弈均衡结果

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  • 1. 东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 辽宁 大连 116025;
    2. 东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心, 辽宁 大连 116025

收稿日期: 2016-05-10

  修回日期: 2017-02-21

  网络出版日期: 2017-12-15

基金资助

国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271045,71571033,71503033,71602021);东北财经大学学科建设支持计划特色学科项目(XKT-201411)

How does the Pessimistic or Optimistic Emotion Influence the Game Equilibrium Outcome in Incidents of Violence and Terrorism

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  • 1. School of Management science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China;
    2. Center of Econometric Analysis and Forecasting, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025, China

Received date: 2016-05-10

  Revised date: 2017-02-21

  Online published: 2017-12-15

摘要

恐怖袭击事件对人类社会的文明底线构成了严峻挑战。无论恐怖分子还是政府反恐力量,双方均具有非常明显的情境决策、甚至非理性决策的特征。本文基于等级依赖期望效用理论,分析了恐怖分子和政府反恐力量对于事态发生的主观概率具有乐观或者悲观预期时,情绪因素对于传统博弈均衡结果的影响,以及该理论结果对于完善反恐措施的管理含义。研究结果表明,当仅有某一方存在着乐观或者悲观情绪时,能够准确地研判事态发生概率的对手将调整选择策略的均衡概率,即任何一方的情绪因素都将影响到对手的策略选择。当双方都存在着情绪因素时,存在乐观情绪的恐怖分子更加倾向于采取非理性的冒险行动,从而造成事态均衡结果具有更大的不确定性。因此,反恐中需要加强情报工作从而准确研判暴恐分子心理状态。

本文引用格式

刘德海, 鲍雪言, 王谢宁 . 恐怖袭击事件中悲观/乐观情绪如何影响博弈均衡结果[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017 , 25(10) : 80 -88 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.10.009

Abstract

Terrorist's attack has become a severe challenge for human society. Both terrorists and government anti-terrorist force possess the obvious characteristics of scenario-dependent decision and irrational emotion decision. For example, the player with the optimistic emotion usually overestimates the probability of the event, and the player with the pessimistic emotion usually underestimates the probability of the event. Obviously, it has important influence on the optimal decision and equilibrium results. In this paper, the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility model of terrorists and government anti-terrorist force is proposed. The Rank-Dependent Expected Utility can be expressed as V(X,u,ω)=π(xi)u(xi), where pi is the objective probability of the event xi, pi∈[0,1], the emotion function ω(pi)=pir is the subjective probability function of affected by the emotion. When ri > 1 means the pessimistic emotion, 0 < ri < 1 means the optimistic emotion, and ri=1 means no emotion. The weight function is defined as π(xi)=ω(p1+p2+…+pi)-ω(p1+p2+…+pi-1), and u(xi) is the traditional on Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility.
And then, the effect of emotion on the equilibrium outcomes of the traditional government-terrorist game model is discussed, where governmental anti-terrorist force or terrorist has an optimistic or pessimistic expectation on the subjective probability about terror attack. Taken by the method of case analysis, the special scenario that both two parties have an optimistic or pessimistic emotion based on Xinjiang 6.28 terrorist incident in Moyu County is further discussed. Lastly, the paper discusses the management meaning on improving anti-terrorist strategy.
The results show that when any one player has an optimistic or pessimistic expectation, the opponent without any emotion should adjust his/her equilibrium probability. That is to say, any party's emotion should influence the opponent's strategy selection. When both two parties have the emotional factor, the terrorist with optimistic expectation should be more inclined to take excessive risk, which causes the equilibrium outcome has the more uncertainty.
The paper's results are useful for the anti-terrorism and emergency plans. First, the government should avoid the short-sighted optimism in order to reduce the unnecessary loss. Second, the government should come to a more serious appraisal of the situation and think of more difficulties, because a stronger defense can banish every attack thought. Third, the government should strengthen the intelligence collecting and information analysis. Thus, anti-terrorism need to strengthen intelligence for accurately judging terrorist's psychological states.

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